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One's notion of justice will be strongly influenced by
political ideology. If you are acutely sensitive to the
wretchedness of poverty or to dehumanizing effects of
racial discrimination, you are likely to disfavor all out-
comes adverse to a disadvantaged person. If you believe
that officials do most things badly, that political "solutions"
are often worse than the disease, you will be inclined to
minimize the role of government, to let "free market"
forces operate, to be skeptical of legal innovations. Your
attitude towards law and justice will be affected by your
belief or disbelief in God, progress, original sin, dialectic
materialism, Darwinian natural selection, quietism, existen-
tialism . . ..
INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 1990 and January 11, 1991 Richard F.
Celeste, then-governor of the state of Ohio granted twenty-eight
Ohio women clemency.2 Twenty-seven women had their sentences
Louis B. Schwartz, The Mind of a Liberal Law Professor: Selections from
the Writings of Louis B. Schwartz, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 847, 886 (1983).
2 Because this set of clemencies was announced a few weeks before
Governor Celeste left office, these cases are often confused with a group of death
row clemency petitions that were later granted by Governor Celeste and were
subsequently challenged by the Director of Rehabilitation and Corrections, the
chairman of the Ohio Adult Parole Authority, the incoming Governor George
Voinovich and newly elected Attorney General, Lee Fisher. The clemencies for
the twenty-eight women were never challenged in court.
The tradition of governors granting clemency on or near major holidays may
have started in the Roman era. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS, JUSTICE,
MERCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 16-17 (1989). Moore says that the Romans
were accustomed to both pardoning and- executing criminals on coronation days
and local holidays, like Passover, to subdue crowds. Id.
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reduced and would be released from prison.3 One woman already
on parole was granted a pardon.' These women were either serving
time or had been incarcerated for crimes, primarily homicide, that
they committed in connection with domestic violence.
This unprecedented act reverberated from coast to coast.
Shortly after Governor Celeste's announcement, Governor William
Donald Schaefer of Maryland also used his clemency powers to
3 The author served as Executive Assistant to Governor Richard Celeste from
1988-1991 and was the point person responsible for implementing this clemency
project.
' Interviews with Kathy Thomas (June 29, 1990 and June 9, 1993)
[hereinafter Thomas Interviews]. These women were also required to perform
200 hours of community service related to domestic violence as a condition of
their release. Id.
' See Isabel Wilkerson, Clemency Granted to 25 Women Convicted for
Assault or Murder, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 22, 1990, at 1. Talk show programs,
including Donahue and The Oprah Winfrey Show, debated the issue and
interviewed some of the women involved. The CBS news magazine show 48
Hours interviewed Governor Celeste and spotlighted the case of Janet Abbott of
Cincinnati, Ohio, one of the 28 women given clemency. See also Tamar Levin,
More States Study Clemencyfor Women Who Kill Abusers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
1991, at A19. The author and Governor Celeste received letters from across the
country from persons who had read news accounts of the impending clemencies.
The overwhelming majority of the correspondence was positive. One letter came
from a juror who had voted to convict one of the women being considered for
release. The juror stated regret for the conviction of the woman and asked that
we do whatever we could to set the woman free. Letters on file with the author.
One newspaper took the lead in criticizing the governor's actions. See Celeste
Defends Commutations, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 27, 190, at 2B; Mary Ann
Sharkey; 0, My Darling Clemency, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 26, 1990, at 8B.
Most of the negative press was centered around prosecution statements. For a
discussion of the prosecutor's point of view, see infra pp. 53-61. See Jane
Prendergast, Reactions Mixed to Freeing Women, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec.
23, 1990, at B-1; see also CelesteAide Claims Most Calls Favor Clemency,NEW
JOURNAL, Dec. 25, 1990, at 3a; Celeste Applied New Law To Women Who
NeededIt, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Dec. 26, 1990, at 14A; Give Cuomo Clemency
Advice, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 3, 1990, at I0A; Celeste Pardons Trigger
Request in Washington, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 26, 1990, at I la; Clemency?
Governor Has Some Tough Calls To Make, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 11,
1990, at 10A.
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reduce the sentences of eight Maryland women.6 As in Ohio, these
women were imprisoned for murdering their spouses or lovers.7
Other states have expressed interest in trying to persuade governors
to consider granting clemency for similarly situated battered
women.' Just recently, Governors Jim Edgar of Illinois, Lawton
Chiles of Florida and Pete Wilson of California have commuted the
sentences of incarcerated battered women. 9
Reviewing and either granting or denying requests for clemency
are routine in penal governance. This Article addresses the legal
and public policy question of whether executive clemency is an
appropriate means of redressing wrongful convictions or too severe
penalties imposed on women who defended themselves against their
batterers. It is this author's position that when a state's constitution
6 Janet Naylor, Schaefer to Free 8 Battered Women Who Fought Back,
WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1991, at Al.
' Eleventh-Hour Clemency, TIME, Dec. 31, 1990, at 17; Alan Johnson, 25
Women Granted State's Clemency, COLUMBUs DISPATCH, Dec. 22, 1990, at I A;
Carolyn Pesce, Inmates Hope for Freedom to Start Over, USA TODAY, Oct. 4,
1990, at 1; Kathleen Sylvester, Ohio Courts Acknowledge Battered Woman
Syndrome, GOVERNING, Dec. 1990, at 18.
8 See Nancy Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 38.
When a woman kills an abusive partner it is an act of revenge or self-defense.
A growing clemency movement argues for a new legal standard. Id. Fifteen
states have set up committees to review similar cases and Florida's Parole Board
has adopted a new rule that recognizes the battered woman's syndrome as a
significant factor for consideration of clemency. See Rita Thaemert, Till Violence
Do Us Part, STATE LEGISLATURES, Mar. 1993, at 26. Since 1990, the author has
consulted with advocates, legal counsel and government officials from the states
of Florida, New York, California, Texas, Michigan and Illinois. See Patt
Morrison, Legislators Listen to Women Who Kill, L.A. TIMES Sept 18, 1991, at
A3. A See Virginia Ellis, Two Women Given Clemency In Killings; Prison:
Wilson Considers Battered Spouse Syndrome as Mitigating Factor, L.A. TIMES,
May 29, 1993, at Al; Ray Long, 4 Go Free in Abuse Cases; Each Killer Was
A Victim Herself Governor Declares, CHI. SUN PRESS, May 13, 1994, at 5; Diane
Rado, Abused Wife Who Killed Is Set Free, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 11,
1993, at lB. Governor Jim Edgar of Illinois granted Debra Babula clemency in
February, 1993. Fortner Governor James Thompson of Illinois had also granted
clemency to incarcerated battered women. See Bob Korwath & Hanke Gratteau,
Edgar Frees Woman Who KilledLover, Ex-Convict Boyfriend Was Abusive, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 4, 1993, at IN.
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gives a governor plenary discretionary clemency authority, he may
use that power to examine the cases of incarcerated battered women
who have killed their abusers in self-defense and grant relief. A
governor can be legally and morally justified in undertaking such
an initiative. However, political pressure and public opinion can
inhibit the exercise of this power despite the fact that violence
against women is pervasive and until recently neither legal nor
physical protection for battered women has been adequate.
This Article examines the role of the chief executive in the
criminal justice system, the need for the discretionary power of
clemency, how beliefs about justice, mercy, crime and punishment
can constrain clemency and the plight of battered women at law
and in society. Part I of the Article, will survey and discuss the
national statistics on domestic violence. Part II provides the Ohio
background as a case study on the clemency for battered women
issue. Part III discusses the brief history of the clemency power and
its legal significance. Part IV presents an analysis of theories on
criminal punishment and public reactions to clemency. Part V
focuses on the historical treatment of women in general, the
relationship of that legacy to battered women and clemency as it
has been and should be applied in the cases of battered women.
I. THE AMERICAN EPIDEMIC OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
In 1992, a congressional report indicated that the most danger-
ous place in the United States for a woman to be is in her home.'"
0 In 1991, Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, sponsored S. 15, The Violence Against Women Act. S. 15, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). The bill's stated purpose is to combat violence and
crimes against women on the streets and in homes. Id. The proposed statute
failed to pass the 102d Congress. It was reintroduced in the 103d Congress. S.
11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The law would federalize violent crimes
against women as hate crimes and authorize civil rights remedies for violations.
Id at § 302. There are also provisions which would provide funding for shelters
and assistance to U.S. Attorneys for the prosecution of sex crimes and domestic
violence crimes. Id. at § 241. Rep. Patricia Schroeder introduced H.R. 1133,
which is similar to Biden's bill, on February 24, 1993. The House passed this
legislation on November 20, 1993 and it has now been included in the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 1st
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In fact, according to the National Coalition Against Domestic
Violence ("NCADV"), every fifteen seconds a woman in America
is abused, and each day at least four women are killed by their
batterers." Former Surgeon General Antonia Novello has labeled
domestic violence an epidemic. 2 Studies show that up to 80% of
wives suing for divorce cite physical abuse by their husbands and
nearly 50% of all homeless women and children report facing
domestic violence at some point. 13
The June 17, 1991 edition of the Journal of the American
Medical Association ("JAMA/") included several articles devoted to
the topic of domestic violence.' 4 JAMA's studies stated that the
Sess. § 3201 (1993), which amended the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.
" The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence ("NCADV") calculated
this figure by taking a 1986 Department of Justice statistic of two million women
abused each year, and dividing this number into the number of seconds in a year.
Telephone interview with NCADV spokesperson (July 2, 1993). A 1994 Justice
Department Report indicates that annually, as compared to males, females
experience over 10 times as many incidents of violence by an intimate. See
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 6 (1994) [hereinafter JUSTICE STATISTICS VIOLENCE].
12 See Antonia C. Novello, A Message From the Surgeon General: Women
and Hidden Epidemics: HIVIAIDS and Domestic Violence, 17 FEMALE PATIENT
17, 23 (1992).
"3 Laura Crites & Donna Coker, What Therapists See That Judges May Miss:
A Unique Guide To Custody Decisions When Spouse Abuse Is Charged, 10
JUDGES J. 9 (1988). The divorce of John and Charlotte Fedders was highly
publicized because of allegations of repeated abuse. The press became interested
in this story because John was the Chief of Enforcement for the Securities and
Exchange Commission during the Reagan administration. He was also being
considered for an appointment to assistant attorney general under Edwin Meese.
See Charlotte Fedders & Laura Elliott, SHATrERED DREAMS, THE STORY OF
CHARLOTTE FEDDERS (1987); Brooks Jackson, Storm Center, John Fedders of
SEC is Pummeled by Legal and Personal Problems, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1985,
at 1. The intractability of the problem is discussed in an article on a Duluth,
Minnesota program that deals with batterers and is considered one of the best in
the nation. However, this project's success in stopping the violence is limited.
See Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at 23.
14 Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Council
Reports, Violence Against Women; Relevance for Medical Practitioners, 267
JAMA 3184-95 (1992) [hereinafter Council Reports]. The Council reported that
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leading cause of injury for women, ages fifteen to forty-four is
domestic violence. 5 Physical injuries of approximately one in five
women who go to emergency rooms are caused by spouse abuse.'6
The pattern of reporting domestic violence incidents is similar to
that of rape incident reporting. Both categories of crimes are
usually underreported.' 7 In fact, JAMA stated that its figure of
studies on prevalence suggest that "from one fifth to one third expected to be
abused during their lifetime. Further, victims of violence by intimates are much
more likely to be reassaulted within six months than those attacked by non-
intimates." Id. at 3185. The American Psychiatric Association ("APA") released
its official position on battered women late last year. The APA stated: "Domestic
violence against women is an extensive and pervasive problem in our society...
. Victims are found in all age, ethnic, religious, socioeconomic, sexual orientation
and educational groups. . . . [Domestic violence] leads to serious psychological
consequences, including anxiety, depression, suicide, traumatic stress disorder and
substance abuse . . . . Because the American Psychiatric Association (APA)
recognizes the major psychological sequence of domestic violence against
women, APA strongly advocates prevention and better detection of domestic
violence ... the improved treatment of victims, offenders and children . .. ."
See American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on Domestic Violence
Against Women, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 630 (1994).
i" Antonia Novello, From the Surgeon General US. Public Health Services,
267 JAMA 3132 (1992). The debate in Congress over whether to spend nearly
$1.4 billion to fund the Violence Against Women Act has led to questions
concerning the accuracy of the statistics. There is some question as to whether
the sample relied on by Novello is too small to represent the general population.
See Joe Hallinan, Oppression & Abuse: Fact and Fiction, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER,
July 7, 1994, at la.
16 C. Everett Koop, Violence Against Women a Global Problem-Address at
the Pan American Health Organization (May 1989) in International Human
Rights Abuses Against Women: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights
and International Organization of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 101 st
Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (Mar. 21 and July 26, 1990). The Journal of the American
Medical Association also cites research that indicates that 61% of the persons
killed by partners from 1976-1987 were women. See Council Reports, supra note
14, at 3186; see also Jacquelyn Campbell, Misogyny and Homicide of Women,
3 ADVANCES HN NUR. SCI. 67, 67-86 (1981). A national study of 1,000 women
found that even though medical personnel were consulted by battered women,
health professionals were less effective than any other group (i.e., social services,
clergy, police, lawyers, shelters, etc.). See Lee H. Bowker & Lorie Maurer, The
Medical Treatment of Battered Wives, 12 WOMEN & HEALTH 25 (1987).
17 MAJORITY STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG.
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two million women severely assaulted is probably underestimated
by two million.' 8
The public's interest in domestic violence is too often only
aroused and sustained in the glare of the sensational case such as
the John and Lorena Bobbitt 9 and the Orenthal James (O.J.)
Simpson trials.2 ° Media coverage of their shocking episodes is
intense.2' However, while there is much scrutiny of the high
2D SESS., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE INCREASE OF RAPE IN AMERICA 2
(Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter Senate Report].
8 See Council Reports, supra note 14, at 3185.
'9 Lorena Bobbitt was charged in August, 1993 with malicious wounding
when she cut off her husband's penis. The penis was reattached after a nine-hour
surgery. Mrs. Bobbitt pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and told the court
that she had been a battered wife. She claimed that John had raped her on the
night the incident happened. John was charged with marital sexual assault. Both
Bobbitts were acquitted of the charges against them, however, Lorena spent five
weeks in a mental ward. See Man Whose Penis Was Cut Arraigned on Sex
Charge, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 6, 1993, at A16; Eric Wee et al., A Year
Later, The Bobbitts Are No Longer On The Cutting Edge, WASH. POST, June 23,
1994, at B 1. Since the trials, John Bobbitt has been arrested twice for assaulting
his fiancee, Kristina Elliott. See Paul Leavitt, New Domestic Trouble for Bobbitt,
Fiancee, USA TODAY, July 5, 1994, at 3A.
20 O.J. Simpson, the Hall of Fame football star, movie actor and sports
commentator, was charged with the murder of his ex-wife, Nicole Brown
Simpson, and her friend Ronald Goldman. Mrs. Simpson and Mr. Goldman were
found stabbed to death outside her home on June 12, 1994. See D.A. 's Complaint
Against Simpson, RECORD, June 18, 1994, at A12. The Simpsons' marriage has
been characterized as stormy. According to police records, on January 1, 1989,
Mr. Simpson beat his wife so badly that she had a split lip, a blackened eye, a
bruised cheek and a hand imprint on her neck. When police arrived at the scene,
they reported that she was hiding in the bushes. The police record quoted O.J.
as saying, "[T]he police have been out here eight times before, and now you are
going to arrest me for this." See Sara Rimer, The Simpson Case: The Marriage,
Handling of 1989 Wife-Beating Case Was a Terrible Joke, Prosecutor Says, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 1994, at 10. Four months later, Simpson pleaded no contest to
a charge of spouse abuse. He was sentenced to 120 hours of community service,
two years probation, fined $200 and had to give $500 to a battered women's
shelter. See also Jane Gross, Simpson Case Galvanizes Us About Domestic
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1994, at 6. Simpson has maintained that he is
innocent of the murder charges.
2 The networks' prime time coverage of O.J. Simpson being pursued down
a Los Angeles freeway by police on Friday, June 17, 1994 is unprecedented.
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profile cases and discussion about guilt, innocence, causation and
blame, women are still being beaten in their homes.22 Only
recently has systematic data been kept on domestic violence.
Historically, battered women have been caught in a nonresponsive
or even hostile criminal justice system, with sometimes either death
or prison as the alternatives. Until the late seventies, women who
killed their abusers faced almost insurmountable obstacles at trial
in getting their stories told. The following cases provide a historical
and legal setting for the development of the right to have testimo-
nial evidence on battering presented at trial. Introduction of this
evidence will help explain the social context and mindset of some
battered women who kill. These cases will serve as reference points
for the discussion of clemency that follows.
More than 95 million viewers are said to have watched some part of the freeway
chase. See John Lafayette, Chasing the Juice, O.J. Saga Throws Media Into
Overdrive, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, June 27, 1994, at 1. The major news magazines,
newspapers and talk shows have devoted considerable time to this story. For
example, the cover story of the July 4, 1994 Time magazine was entitled, When
Violence Hits Home, The Simpson Case Awakens America to the Epidemic of
Domestic Abuse. The same week, Newsweek had a photograph of Simpson on the
cover and the title read, Living in Terror, Who is at Risk, The Warning Signs. A
telephone poll of 751 adults conducted by Princeton Survey Associates found that
8 in 10 persons believed that the media has paid too much attention to the case.
See O.J. Poll Study in Black and White, S. D. UNIoN-TRIB., July 10, 1994, at
A-3.
22 See Jonathan Freedland, O.J. Simpson Case Throws Light on 3, 000 Wife
Killings A Year, GUARDIAN, July 23, 1994, at 15. The murder of Nihalla Abekwa
of Morris County, New Jersey by her husband Mohammed Abekwa received
international attention when King Hussein of Jordan was asked to intervene in
the situation. Mohammed is in Juweideh Prison in Jordan and has confessed to
the crime. New Jersey prosecutor W. Michael Murphy, Nihalla's sister Asimi
Dapour and President Bill Clinton wanted Mohammed extradited to the United
States. While King Hussein was in the United States to sign a Jordan-Israel peace
agreement, the king was questioned about this case. King Hussein said,
"Certainly we'll do everything we can to resolve this problem." Jordanian
officials will allow Murphy to participate in Mohammed's trial in Jordan.
Mohammed says that he is sorry for the killing, but he will not return the
couple's children, Lisa and Simi. See Prime Time Live (ABC television
broadcast, July 28, 1994). Mrs. Dapour has stated that Mohammed often beat her
sister, Nihalla, and his children. Id.
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II. THE PLIGHT OF BATTERED WOMEN WHO DEFENDED
THEMSELVES IN OHIO: A CASE STUDY
Twenty-three year old Kathy Thomas,23 an African-American
female from Cleveland, Ohio, had lived with her boyfriend Reuben
Daniels for almost four years. On the evening of January 12, 1978,
while preparing dinner, Reuben became agitated with Kathy and
began striking her. This was not the first time that Kathy had been
severely beaten by Reuben.24 As the beating escalated, Reuben,
according to Kathy, pushed her from the kitchen into the living
room. She fell on the couch, where she picked up Reuben's gun
and fatally shot him.
Kathy's legal options were dire. They included accepting a plea
of seven to twenty-five years for involuntary manslaughter,
pleading insanity, because in Ohio there is no diminished capacity
defense, or going to trial with a self-defense claim for which she
would have the burden of proof.25 She received some legal advice
to accept the pleas, which was not uncommon in these kinds of
cases. Many attorneys had believed that this kind of homicide was
an open and shut case. A young attorney, however, convinced her
to go to trial. He believed, as Kathy did, that her actions were
justified because her life was in danger at the very moment that she
shot Reuben.
Kathy was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
fifteen years to life. On appeal, her attorneys raised the issue that
the trial judge had wrongly refused to allow two experts to testify
on the battered woman syndrome. The attorneys contended that this
evidence would have proved that Kathy had reasonably feared
23 See State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981); see Thomas
Interviews, supra note 4.
24 Thomas, 423 N.E.2d at 138.
25 These alternatives were similar to those faced by battered women in other
jurisdictions before courts allowed battered women expert testimony at trial.
Most women who claimed insanity were convicted. See Elizabeth M. Schneider
& Susan B. Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in
Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 149, 149
(1978).
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imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and, therefore, had
acted in self-defense in killing Reuben. The Cuyahoga County
Court of Appeal agreed and remanded for a new trial. The Ohio
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, citing eight
separate reasons from Court of Appeals Judge Blanche Krupansky's
dissenting opinion against allowing such evidence to be admit-
ted.26 Kathy served nine years.and eight months before she was
paroled.
The battered woman syndrome at that time was novel. Dr.
Lenore Walker, a clinical psychologist, developed this theory to
explain why women often remain in abusive relationships. 27 The
26 Ohio Court of Appeals Judge Blanche Krupansky set forth eight reasons
for the proper exclusion of expert testimony about the "battered wife syndrome":
1. There was no proper proffer of expert testimony.
2. Appellant's [Defendant's] expert had no personal contact with
appellant.
3. No hypothetical question was propounded to appellant's expert
witness.
4. There was no determination that appellant was in fact a battered
woman.
5. Analysis of the issues raised was within the realm of the jury.
6. The trial court's jury charge more than adequately covered the
situation.
7. There was no prejudice to appellant.
8. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Thomas, 423 N.E.2d at 138 n.1.
The court said that the testimony was irrelevant and immaterial to the issue
of whether Kathy acted in self-defense, and that the battered wife syndrome was
not sufficiently developed as a matter of commonly accepted scientific
knowledge to warrant expert testimony. Id.
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo.
1981) also refused to allow expert testimony in a battered woman's case because
the state of the art was not adequately demonstrated. Id. at 1377; see also Mullis
v. State, 282 S.E.2d 334 (Ga. 1981) (holding that exclusion of testimony on
battered woman syndrome not error).
27 See LENORE G. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); THE
BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984); Battered Women, Psychology and Public
Policy, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1179, 1179-82 (1984). A number of psychologists
and sociologists also contributed to this area of research. See JULIE BLACKMAN,
INTIMATE VIOLENCE (1989); ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL
(1987); CHARLES EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL (1987); RICHARD J.
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battered woman syndrome describes a pattern of severe physical
and psychological abuse in an intimate relationship, usually
inflicted by the man upon the woman.28 Often a three-phase cycle
occurs, resulting in the woman's learned helplessness, and her
inability to make or execute the decision to leave. First, there is the
tension building phase, when the batterer is usually in an agitated
state. This is followed by the explosion phase, when the abuser
beats the victim and finally, the cooling off or honeymoon phase;
the batterer is remorseful at this phase, promising not to repeat his
actions. In fact, the batterer may try to buy back the affections of
his victim through romance.29 While some feminists, legal advo-
cates and other clinicians have begun to question the adequacy of
Walker's theory in capturing a full range of reasons for why
GELLES, THE VIOLENT HOME: A STUDY OF PHYSICAL AGGRESSION BETWEEN
HUSBANDS AND WIVES (1971); DEL MARTIN, BATrERED WIVES (1976).
2 While it must be acknowledged that some men are battered and others in
same sex relationships are also abusive, the evidence shows that the majority of
battering cases are men beating women. Dr. Walker describes the battered
woman as follows: "A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected
to any forceful physical and psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce
her to do something he wants her to do without any concern for her rights."
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 27, at XV. The battered woman
syndrome is not a defense, but evidence admitted to show that a woman killed
in self-defense or committed some other crime because of the fear of being
beaten. However, the New Hampshire Legislature is debating whether the
battered woman's syndrome should be a separate defense. See John Milne, Abuse
As Defense Being Mulled, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1994, at 43; see also Charles
J. Aron, In Defense of Battered Women, Is Justice Blind? 4 HUM. RTS. 14
(1993). Aron raises the issue of coercion and proffers of battered woman
syndrome testimony at the federal level. Seventy-two-year-old Faye Copeland,
the oldest woman on death row, has appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court for
a new trial based on the battered woman's syndrome. Mrs. Copeland and her
husband, Ray, were sentenced to death in 1991 for the murders of five transient
workers. See Death Row, COM. APPEAL, Feb. 5, 1994, at 2A. The Copelands
would lure the drifters to their farm house, open up checking accounts for the
men and would write bogus checks at cattle auctions. Ray Copeland would then
kill the men before anyone had discovered the bad checks. See Ray Copeland,
78, Oldest Death Row Inmate, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 22, 1993, at 11.
29 LENORE G. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL
AND How SOCIETY RESPONDS 42 (1989).
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battered women often do not leave their abusers,3" the battered
woman syndrome is now recognized in most jurisdictions as a
scientifically acceptable theory.3 The challenge to the exclusive-
ness of this theory is not at issue in this Article.
30 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-
Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 195, 207 (1986). While Schneider acknowledges that the battered
woman syndrome does not mean that battered women are "passive, sick,
powerless and victimized," she states that the syndrome terminology can stereo-
type women in these situations as acting abnormally. Id. at 207, 214; see also
Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the
Representation of Battered Women Who Kill, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 227
(1986). Blackman provides guidance on how batteredwomen experts can be used
at various stages of a case. Id. She also criticizes what she calls the singular
image of "the battered woman" or the classic battered woman as helpless, white
and middle class. Id. She points to how the criminal justice system fails to deal
appropriately with women who do not fit a certain stereotype. Id. This analysis
is significant because it raises questions about how women of color or women
of other classes and ethnic groups may be treated by the system. See Sharon
Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist
Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 191 (1991); Julie Blackman, Emerging
Images of Severely Battered Women and the Criminal Justice System, 8 BEHAV.
SC. & L. 121, 121-130 (1990); Michael Dowd, Battered Women: A Perspective
on Injustice, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 13-21 (1993).
Walker has defended her terminology as a way of drawing cognitive
corrections to an existing database for clinical professionals. However, she also
warns that her research and terminology be used with "great caution." See
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 27, at XI. For examples of how
prosecutors can use this theory at the trials of batterers, see Alana Bowman, A
Matter of Justice: Overcoming Juror Bias in Prosecutions of Batterers Through
Expert Testimony of the Common Experiences of Battered Women, 2 So. CAL.
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 219 (1992); Joan M. Schroeder, Using Battered
Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Prosecution of a Batterer, 76 IOWA L. REv.
553 (1991).
31 See infra note 36 and accompanying text and discussion at pp. 16-17. On
November 2, 1992, President George Bush signed into law H.R. 1252, the
Battered Women's Testimony Act of 1992. This law authorized a study on the
admissibility of expert testimony regarding battered women in the defense of
criminal cases under state law; set aside $600,000 for the State Justice Institute
to disseminate training materials for attorneys and advocates. See Statement By
President Bush On Signing The Battered Women's Testimony Act of 1992, Oct.
27, 1992, 1992-93, II PUB. PAPERS 2028 (1993).
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Kathy Thomas's attorney tried to submit testimony to the jury
on battered woman syndrome before it decided Thomas's fate.
Other jurisdictions had begun to allow this kind of expert testimony
and had also recognized the impact of gender bias in applying the
traditional self-defense rule."
32 Even before the battered woman syndrome theory was developed, some
courts acknowledged that certain types of evidence should be admissible to
explain a woman's self-defense claim. See People v. Glacalone, 217 N.W. 758
(Mich. 1928) (reversing lower court because it would not admit certain evidence
concerning shooting death of defendant's husband). In 1954, an Oklahoma
appeals court reversed a decision because the jury was not given a self-defense
instruction when a battered woman used a knife to protect herself against her
unarmed attacker. See Easterling v. State, 267 P.2d 185 (Okla. Crim. 1954).
See also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trialfor Women: Sex Bias
in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 625, 636 (1980). The
law of self-defense is an exception to the principle that it is immoral to kill. See
Deborah Kochan, Beyond the Battered Woman Syndrome: An Argument for the
Development of New Standards and the Incorporation of a Feminine Approach
to Ethics, 1 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (1989). Self-defense rules evolved
based on the concept of two men of equal strength engaged in a violent
encounter. See BROWNE, supra note 27, at 172. The law had not anticipated a
situation where a woman would have to defend herself, especially against the
man who was her husband and her lord. Killing a husband in medieval England,
where the self-defense doctrine developed was not only punishable as a homicide,
but a woman could be tried for treason as well. See CYNTHIA GILLESPIE,
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 37 (1989).
One of the main issues concerning self-defense and the battered woman is
the requirement that the threat of bodily harm or death be immediate or
imminent and that the woman's actions be reasonable. Imminent is defined as
"[s]omething which is threatening to happen at once." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990). The definitions for immediate include: "present;
without delay; not deferred by any interval of time." Id. The one-time, sudden,
violent episode between strangers is the scenario most easily understood. Even
when violence among acquaintances occurs, if the person who is not responsible
for starting the incident repels a present attack with deadly force to save his or
her life or to avoid great bodily harm, a self-defense claim is appropriate. Most
battered women who kill do so in the midst of a one-on-one encounter. See
discussion infra p. 57. However, there are situations where the traditionally
accepted definitions of "imminence" or "immediate" may not match the
defendant's perception. For example, if an abuser beats his wife and tells her that
he is going to kill her when he wakes up, the threat of death may be imminent
in the mind of the abused woman, and she may resort to a preemptive strike,
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fearing that if she does not attack, she will die. The obvious question is, why
does she stay with the batterer? This simplistic solution may be apparent to
persons not trapped in such a circumstance. However, a battered woman may or
may not fully appreciate this option for a variety of reasons. An expert on
battering can explain why a battered woman chooses one response as opposed to
another. See discussion supra pp. 10-13.
See Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill
Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371 (1993). Rosen analyzes the principles of
proportionality, fault and necessity and proposes that a necessity self-defense
instruction may be more appropriate in some cases. This different approach on
the imminence requirement in self-defense claims by battered women who kill
temporarily incapacitated abusers is similar to the German Theory of the
Necessity Approach. See B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us Part: A Comparative
Law Approach To Justifying Lethal Self-Defense By Battered Women, 1991 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 169, 206 (1991). Byrd suggests that self-defense could
apply in cases where there is "imminent danger" as distinguished from the
"imminent attack" requirement in many U.S. jurisdictions. If there were
imminent danger, a rule of defensive necessity would operate as follows:
An actor is justified in causing harm to another individual if
1) the harm is necessary to protect the actor or any other party from
imminent danger unjustifiably caused by the individual harmed;
2) the harm caused by the act is not (considerably) greater than the
harm would thereby be, and;
3) the harm avoided was not avoidable through an otherwise available
less harmful alternative.
A New Mexico Court of Appeals has already used an expanded definition
of imminence. See State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268, 1270 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)
(the danger of death and bodily harm must appear imminent to the defendant).
The reasonableness requirement is based on the perspective of a reasonable
man and some argue disadvantages battered women when they are held to that
standard. See Phyliss L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women
Who Kill in Self Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 123-25 (1985); see also
Lawrence S. Lustberg & John V. Jacobi, The Battered Woman as a Reasonable
Person: A Critique of the Appellate Division Decision in State v. McClain, 22
SETON HALL L. REv. 365 (1992). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a reasonable
woman standard for sexual harassment cases. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872
(9th Cir. 1991). For a discussion on the problem of justifying rather than
excusing killing in self-defense by battered women because of fears of self-help,
see Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting A Historical
Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 11 (1986);
see also Marilyn Hall Mitchell, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide, 24 WAYNE
L. REv. 1705, 1731 (1978) (discourages establishment of a "battered wife"
defense comparable to self-defense because of vigilante concerns).
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For example, in 1977, a Washington state court acknowledged
the need for more subjective consideration of the self-defense
claims made by women when their alleged assailants are men.33
In the 1979 landmark case of Ibn-Tamas v United States,34 the
D.C. Court of Appeals held that the trial court had failed to state
an appropriate ground for refusing to allow a clinical psychologist
to testify as to whether the defendant, a battered woman, reasonably
believed that she was in imminent danger of being killed when she
killed her batterer.35
During the 1980s, a few jurisdictions began to admit expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome.36 Petitioners objected
31 State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977). The Wanrow court said:
[T]he persistent use of the masculine gender leaves the jury with the
impression the objective standard to be applied is that applicable to an
altercation between two men. . . . Until such time as the effects of that
history [sex discrimination] are eradicated, care must be taken to assure
that our self-defense instructions afford women the right to have their
conduct judged in light of the individual physical handicaps which are
the product of sex discrimination. To fail to do so is to deny the right
of the individual woman involved to trial by the same rules which are
applicable to male defendants.
Id. at 558-59.
14 407 A.2d. 626 (D.C. 1979).
" -Id. at 631.
36 See Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d
892 (Me. 1981); State v. Baker, 424 A.2d 171 (N.H. 1980); State v. Hodges, 716
P.2d 563 (Kan. 1986); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984); People v.
Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312
(Wash. 1984). But see State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (overturning
appeals court decision to allow expert testimony in case where abuser was
asleep). In People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), the
California Court of Appeals held that although Brenda Aris should have been
allowed to present expert testimony, the error was harmless. See also Alan
Dershowitz, The Abuse Excuse, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 16, 1994, at A-15.
Dershowitz uses the trials of the Menendez brothers and Lorena and John Bobbitt
as examples of how he feels that the integrity of the legal system is being
threatened by persons who commit a violent crime and then rely on self-defense
because of abuse claim. See also Stephanie Goldberg, Fault Line, A.B.A. J., June
1994, at 36. Judging from the daily tales of rage and forgiveness on the
television talk shows, it appears that the nation has turned from punishing crimes
to excusing them. But perception is not reality. Id.
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to the exclusion of expert testimony on constitutional grounds.
These battered women defendants questioned the fairness of their
trials based on the issue of the right to present a defense. Because
expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome was not admissi-
ble, defendants could not adequately explain their self-defense
claim. These challenges were not successful.37 However, Judge
Jones of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals criticized trial courts
for not allowing use of this evidence. He questioned the fairness of
such trials in Thomas v. Arn.38
A. Legislative and Gubernatorial Initiatives
Ohio was one of the last states to allow testimony regarding
battered woman syndrome at trial. Between 1989 and 1991, all
three branches of government would come to the conclusion that
" See Thomas v. Am, 728 F.2d 813, 815 (6th Cir. 1984) (Jones, J.,
concurring); Tourlakis v. Morris, 738 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D. Ohio 1990); Fennell
v. Goolsby, 630 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1985); State v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209
(Ill. App. 1983); State v. Burton, 464 So.2d 421, 428-29 (La. App. 1985); see
also Erich D. Anderson & Anne Read-Andersen, Constitutional Dimensions of
the Battered Woman Syndrome, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 363 (1992).
38 In my view, the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony
on the "battered wife syndrome" impugned the fundamental
fairness of the trial process thereby depriving [the defendant]
of her constitutional right to a fair trial. There is sufficient
literature which suggests that the public and thus, juries, do
not understand the scope of the problem concerning battered
women. Furthermore, they tend to be unsympathetic toward
battered women. They fail to understand, for instance, why
battered women do not leave their partners. Ascertaining a
battered woman's state of mind is crucial to a determination
of this and other aspects of her behavior. It may bear on the
responsibility or lack of it, for her response. In my opinion
the expert testimony could have clarified the unique psycho-
logical state of mind of the battered woman and should have
been admitted by the trial judge. The law cannot be allowed
to be mired in antiquated notions about human responses
when a body of knowledge is available which is capable of
providing insight.
Am, 728 F.2d at 815 (Jones, J., concurring).
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battered women who killed their abusers needed to be able to better
explain their situations by introducing expert testimony. In 1989,
Representative Joe Kozuria of Lorain, Ohio introduced House Bill
484 in the Ohio House of Representatives.39 This bill would take
various forms before it was passed and signed into law by
Governor Richard Celeste on August 6, 1990. Ohio is one of a few
states that has such a law.
40
Before the bill was passed in the Ohio General Assembly, the
governor decided that, before he left office, he wanted to do
39 (A) The general assembly hereby declares that it recognizes
both of the following, in relation to the "battered woman
syndrome":
(1) That the syndrome currently is a matter of
commonly accepted scientific knowledge;
(2) That the subject matter and details of the
syndrome are not within the general understanding
or experience of a person who is a member of the
general populace and are not within the field of
common knowledge;
(B) If a person is charged with an offense involving the use
of force against another and the person, as a defense to the
offense charged, raises the affirmative defense of self-
defense, the person may introduce expert testimony of the
"battered woman syndrome" and expert testimony that the
person suffered from that syndrome as evidence to establish
the requisite belief of an imminent danger of death or great
bodily harm that is necessary, as an element of the affirma-
tive defense, to justify the person's use of the force in
question.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Anderson Supp. 1990) (enacted).
The legislature also amended the law on insanity to allow the admission of
battered woman syndrome expert testimony. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2945.392 (Anderson 1990).
40 Missouri passed a similar law. to Ohio's in 1987. Mo. REv. STAT. §
563.033(1) (Supp. 1988); see also Kathee R. Brener, Note, Missouri's New Law
on "Battered Spouse Syndrome" A Moral Victory, A Partial Solution, 33 ST.
LOuIS U. L.J. 227 (1988). Professor Holly Maguigan takes issue with proposals
to require both a different self-defense standard and changing evidentiary rules
to explicitly allow "battered woman syndrome" testimony at trial. She indicates
that existing rules should in most cases be sufficient, if applied properly. See
Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense Myths and Misconceptions
in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PENN L. REV. 379, 420-424. (1991).
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something to redress what he perceived to be an unjust result of the
law in the cases of battered women who, while defending them-
selves against abusive companions by striking back at their abusers,
had committed a felony and were, therefore, in Ohio prisons.
Governor Celeste made a policy decision that a systemic solution
was required to compensate for the systemic legal defect. In
November 1989, he told his executive assistant responsible for
criminal justice that he wanted to review the cases of battered
women incarcerated for crimes against their batterers for possible
grants of clemency.4' As the result of a two-phase study, 97
women out of approximately 400 were identified, who were in
prison for violent crimes were identified as eligible for consider-
42ation.
The data gathered for the governor from the Ohio women's
prisons reflected national trends. Women are the fastest growing
segment of the prison population. According to a 1991 Bureau of
Justice Statistics report, from 1980 to 1991 the number of females
incarcerated increased by 202%. 43 Most women are in prison for
nonviolent, property-related crimes." Over the past few years, the
dramatic increase in female incarcerations has been directly linked
to drug-related offenses.45 Nationwide, one-quarter of the women
in prison for violent crimes were convicted of the homicide of a
relative or an intimate.46 Sixty percent of these women were likely
to have committed their offense against a male.47 Forty-one
percent of these women have been victims of either physical or
4, While the author dealt with numerous other issues primarily of a
regulatory or administrative nature, the author was also the point person on
prison issues.
42 OHIO DEPT OF REHABILITATION & CORRECTIONS, REP. AND RES. ON
BATTERED SPOUSAL/WOMAN SYNDROME As IT AFFECTS THE OHIO DEPT. OF
REHABILITATION & CORRECTIONS, Columbus, Ohio (Apr. 1990) [hereinafter
OHIo REHAB. & CORRECT. REP.].
4' BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WOMEN
IN PRISON 1 (1991).
4 Id. at 4.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 3.
47 Id.
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sexual abuse, or both.48 There are thirty-three women on death
row in state prisons.49 Eighteen of these women received the death
penalty for killing males. ° Of the eighteen, ten were married to
or were in a live-in relationship with the deceased.5"
Prison terms for women convicted of violent crimes tend to be
long. Nationally, women convicted of murder have the longest
sentences serving just over 162 years.5 2 In Ohio, eighty-three
percent of the women surveyed, who had seriously assaulted or
killed their abusers, received sentences ranging from twenty-five
years to life.53
After the initial results of the prison surveys evaluated in April,
1990, Governor Celeste's aide recommended that the usual process
for clemency be followed. 4 However, the eligible women would
41 id. at 6.
41 See Victor L. Streib, Capital Punishment for Female Offenders: Present
Female Death Row Inmates and Death Sentences and Execution of Female
Offenders January 1, 1973 to May 1, 1993 (May 18, 1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Journal of Law and Policy).
50 Id. at 10-13.
SlId.
s Id. at 1.
s OHio REHAB. & CORRECT. REP., supra note 42.
14 The author felt that the procedures in place for review were adequate,
knowing that any inmate could petition and that each case would be scrutinized
on its own merits. In Ohio, the Adult Parole Authority ("Parole Board") has the
statutory power to recommend a pardon, commutation, reprieve or parole to the
governor if "such action would further the interests of justice and be consistent
with the welfare and security of society." See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.03
(Baldwin 1992). The Ohio Revised Code and the administrative rules which
govern the Parole Board's release procedures require that notice be sent to the
prosecuting attorney, judge of the common pleas court and in some circum-
stances the victim or victim's representative. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2967.12 (Baldwin 1992). The administrative rules require that all applications
for a pardon, reprieve, or commutation be made in writing. There is no
stipulation as to who can make the application. Therefore, the inmate, her
attorney or even a family member could request review by the Parole Board. See
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5120:1-1-15 (1992). Among the discretionary factors that
the Parole Board can consider are: the inmate's conduct during her term of
imprisonment; the nature of the offense for which the inmate was convicted; the
inmate's pattern of criminal or delinquent behavior prior to the current term of
imprisonment; any recommendations made by the staff of the Department of
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receive assistance in preparing their petitions if they so desired.
Over the next eleven months, the Ohio Parole Board and the
governor's office reviewed 123 cases.
An important aspect of the clemency process was the time spent
by the governor's staff educating the parole board on the battered
woman syndrome and the recent change in Ohio law allowing
expert testimony on the syndrome. At the onset of this initiative,
the law in Ohio had not changed to admit expert testimony at trial
on battered woman syndrome. However, the debate about this issue
had begun in the Ohio legislature. As a result of receiving this new
information, the parole board modified its procedure to facilitate
the clemency process. The board had a practice of not hearing a
petition if an inmate had been denied a request for parole or
clemency within the previous two years." This policy had been
adopted internally and was later changed. There were several
battered women who were in that category. The parole board
decided that it would waive that rule,56 so that it would not be an
obstacle in completing this project.
In the first round of reviews, the Ohio Parole Board recom-
mended that seventeen women be granted clemency. The governor
reduced the sentences of twenty-five women, sixteen of the
seventeen that the parole board had approved and nine other
petitioners, as well.57 The second round of reviews by the parole
board included one recommendation. The governor granted three,
including a pardon to Kathy Thomas, and the reduction of a death
Rehabilitation and Correction and any factors which the board determines to be
relevant. 1d. There are also mandatory considerations, including: reports by
institutional staff members, the inmate's official prior criminal record, pre- and
post-sentencing reports, physical mental examinations and written or oral
statements by the inmate. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5120:1-1-09 (1992).
" Telephone interview with RaymondCapots, Chairman, Ohio Parole Board,
Columbus, Ohio (Apr. 1990).
56 Interview with Raymond Capots, Chairman, Ohio Parole Board,
Columbus, Ohio (Apr. 1990).
17 This means that there were differences of opinion on ten women. Three
of the board's unfavorable recommendations were actually close five-to-four
votes. Ninety-five other women did not receive favorable responses either from
the board or the governor.
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penalty sentence to life in prison." Each case was reviewed on its
own individual basis.
As this process was taking place, and while the Ohio legislature
debated the admissibility of battered woman expert testimony, the
Ohio Supreme Court decided the Brenda Koss case. Koss59
overruled State v Thomas. Brenda Koss, like Kathy Thomas, was
a resident of Cleveland, Ohio.6 ° She was married to Michael Koss
and had been battered for years. She testified at trial that at
different times Michael had tried to smother her and once had put
a radio in the tub to electrocute her.6' On May 2, 1986, Michael
was found dead in the front bedroom with a single gunshot wound
to the head. Brenda initially denied shooting her husband. She said
to police that around 1:00 a.m., while undressing to go to bed her
husband beat her, and the next thing she remembered was a
noise.62 Brenda was indicted for the murder of her husband and,
at trial, tried to introduce evidence regarding battered woman
syndrome. The court excluded that testimony.6 Brenda was found
guilty of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to eight to twenty-
five years in prison.64
Justice Alice R. Resnick had joined the court between the time
of the Thomas decision and the Koss appeal. 65 The Ohio Supreme
Court uses a lottery system in deciding who in the majority writes
the opinions. Justice Resnick drew the lot for the Koss case.66
In Koss, the court recognized that the battered woman syndrome
had "gained substantial scientific acceptance to warrant admissi-
bility"; 67 a defendant would have to offer evidence which
8 Beatrice Lumpkin was removed from death row.
59 State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990); see also Laura Huber Martin,
Note, Ohio Joins the Majority and Allows Expert Testimony on the Battered
Woman Syndrome: State v. Koss, 60 CINN. L. REV. 877 (1992).
60 See Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970.
61 Id. at 971.
62 Id.
63 id.
64 id.
65 Justice Resnick was elected to the bench in 1988.
66 Telephone interview with Alice Robie Resnick, Justice, Ohio Supreme
Court (June 16, 1993).
67 Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 974.
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establishes that she is a battered woman in order for that expert
testimony to be admitted;68 and the admission of expert testimony
regarding battered woman syndrome does not establish a new
defense or justification.69 The testimony assists the trier of fact in
determining "whether the defendant acted out of a [sic] honest
belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm and that the use of such force was her only means of
escape. 7 °
Before Koss and the legislative change allowing expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome, the defendant was
handicapped in presenting her claim of self-defense. A number of
battered women were incarcerated after being unable to present
evidence and expert testimony on battering. Some entered pleas of
guilty and accepted long sentences because they knew that they had
little chance of acquittal. The courts would not hear their stories.
For these women, the only means of relief was executive clemency.
III. CLEMENCY
Clemency is a discretionary executive power.7' It is both legal
and political in nature: legal because this authority comes from a
constitution72 and political because an executive can consider
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 id.
71 "The President ... shall have Power to grant reprieves and pardons for
offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2 Cl. 1.
7 The Ohio Constitution contains a provision typical of states authorizing
clemency:
[The Governor] shall have power, after conviction, to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, for all crimes and offenses, except treason
and cases of impeachment, upon such conditions as he may think
proper; subject, however, to such regulations, as to the manner of
applying for pardons, as may be prescribed by law. Upon conviction
for treason, he may suspend the execution of the sentence, and report
the case to the general assembly, at its next meeting, when the general
assembly shall either pardon, commute the sentence, direct its
execution, or grant a further reprieve. He shall communicate to the
24 JOURNAL OF LA WAND POLICY
factors that judges and juries cannot.73 Unlike other administrative
general assembly, at every regular session, each case of reprieve,
commutation, or pardon granted, stating the name and crime of the
convict, the sentence, its date, and the date of the commutation,
pardon, or reprieve, with his reasons therefore.
OHIO CONST., art. III, § 11 (emphasis added).
Thirty-six states which authorize capital punishment also have clemency
provisions. ALA. CONST., amend. 38; ALA. CODE § 15-18-100 (1982); ARIZ.
CONST., art. V, § 5; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-443, 31-445 (1986 and Supp.
1992); ARK. CONST., art. VI, § 18; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-607, 16-93-204
(Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. CONST., art. VII, § 1; CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12030(a)
(West 1992); COLO. CONST., art. IV, § 7; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-17-101, 16-
17-102 (1986); CONN. CONST., art. IV, § 13; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-26 (1988);
DEL. CONST., art. VII, § 1; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2103 (1991); FLA.
CONST., art. IV, § 8; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (West Supp. 1991); GA.
CONST., art. IV, § 2, para. 2; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-9-20, 42-9-42 (1991);
IDAHO CONST., art. IV, § 7; IDAHO CODE §§ 20-240 (Supp. 1992), 67-804
(1989); ILL. CONST., art. V, § 12; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1003-3-13
(1991); IND. CONST., art. V, § 17; IND. CODE §§ 11-9-2-1 to 11-9-2-4, 35-38-6-8
(1988); Ky. CONST., § 77; LA. CONST., art. IV, § 4-513 (1990); MisS. CONST.,
art. V, § 124; MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-115 (1981); MO. CONST., art. IV, § 7;
MO. ANN. STAT. § 217.220 (Vernon Supp. 1992), 552.070 (Vernon 1987);
MONT. CONST., art. VI, § 12; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 83-1, 127 to 46-23-316
(1991); NEB. CONST., art. IV, § 13; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83.1, 127 to 83-1, 132
(1987); NEV. CONST., art. V, § 13; NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.080 (1991); N.H.
CONST., pt. 2, art. 52; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:23 (1988); N.J. CONST., art.
V, § 2, para. 1; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-17 (West 1990); N.C. CONST., art. III,
§ 5(6); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 147-23 to 147-25 (1987); OHIO CONST., art. III,
§ 11; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2967.1 to 2967.12 (Anderson 1987 and Supp.
1991); OKLA. CONST., art. VI, § 10; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.11a (Supp.
1990); OR. CONST., art. V, § 14; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 144.640 to 144.670 (1991);
PA. CONST., art. IV, § 9, 61; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 2130 (Supp. 1992); S.C.
CONST., art. IV, § 14; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-21-910 to 24-21-1000 (Law. Co-
op. 1977 and Supp. 1991); S.D. CONST., art. IV, § 3; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 23A-27A-20 to 23A-27A-21, 24-14-1 (1988); TENN. CONST., art. III, § 6;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-27-101 to 40-27-109 (1990); TEX. CONST., art. IV, § 11;
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 48.01 (West 1979); UTAH CONST., art. VII,
§ 12; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-5.5 (Supp. 1992); VA. CONST., art. V, § 12;
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-230 (Michie 1991); WASH. CONST., art. III, § 9; WASH.
REV. CODE § 10.01.120 (1992); WYO. CONST., art. IV, § 5; WYO. STAT. § 7-13-
801 (1987).
7' The Supreme Court in United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150
(1833), acknowledged the limitations of the justice system when it stated the
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decisions which may be delegated to bureaucrats 'in the executive
branch, clemency decisions are made personally by the president or
by a governor. Clemency is an instrument of equity in the criminal
law designed to promote the general welfare by preventing
injustice.74
The word clemency is derived from two Latin words: clemens,
meaning merciful and clementia, meaning mildness. Our modem
day concept of justice tempered by mercy has its roots in the
Judeo-Christian ethics of both punishment and forgiveness. Little
is known about the practice of clemency in the Greek era except
that to obtain a pardon in Athens, the applicant had to have the
signature of 6,000 citizens.75 The New Testament story of Pontius
Pilate, Jesus and Barabbas illustrates how an early century Roman
authority exercised that power.76
There are several forms of clemency, including amnesty,
commutations, pardons, remissions of fines and forfeitures and
reprieves. Amnesty is an act of forgiveness given by the govern-
ment to a class of persons guilty of political offenses. A commuta-
tion reduces the original sentence to a lesser degree of punishment.
Pardons can be either absolute or conditional, and will either
completely forgive the offender of the crime and all consequences
of conviction or there may be requirements the grantee must fulfill
either before or after the pardon is granted. The remission of fines
and forfeitures releases a person from indebtedness. Finally, a
reprieve postpones a scheduled execution.
Clemency, in the English system, is traced back to the Teutonic
following: "It is a constituent part of the judicial system that the judge sees only
with judicial eyes and knows nothing respecting a particular case of which he is
not judicially informed." Id. at 161.
" In re Flourney, 1 Ga. 606, 607 (1846). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
recognized that legal decisions and justice are not synonymous. He said "Of
relative justice law may know something; of expediency it knows much; with
absolute justice it does not concern itself." See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, VII
The Works of Oliver Wendell Holmes; Pages From an Old Volume of Life,
CRIME & AUTOMATISM 324 (1891).
" MOORE, supra note 2, at 16; see also Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget,
Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136, 139 (1964).
76 See Matthew 27:15-23.
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peoples.77 During the Saxon rule, kings granted clemency for
offenses committed by members of their own household.7" The
laws of Aethelberht, the first Christian Saxon King, made reference
to clemency.79 Historically, there have been struggles over who
should be able to grant mercy. William the Conqueror of
Normandy wanted to strengthen the view that clemency was the
exclusive power of the King. 0 However, the church could also
claim the "benefit of clergy" exemption in criminal matters and
therefore lessened the Kings absolute clemency power.8 '
In 1536, Henry VIII was more successful at possessing the
exclusive right of clemency-that authority would remain with the
monarch through the reigns of the Tudors and Stuarts.82 As the
English criminal common law developed, the right and tradition of
clemency continued to be exercised. 3
When the American colonies were formed, the monarch
delegated his power of clemency in the colonial charters.84 In the
English colonies, the chief colonial officer, usually a governor,
could obtain leave from the crown to exercise the prerogative of
mercy85
During the revolutionary period, newly formed states and the
77 CHRISTEN JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(1922).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
8' 27 Henry VIII, c. 24, cited in Stanley Grupp, Some Historical Aspects of
Pardon in England, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 51, 55, 66 (1963):
That no person or persons, of what estate or degrees soever they be
... shall have any power or authority to pardon or remit any treasons,
murders, manslaughter or any felonies whatsoever they be ... but that
the King's highness, his heirs and successors, Kings of the realm, shall
have the whole and sole power and authority thereof united and knit
to the Imperial crown of this realm, as of good right and equality it
appertaineth; any grants, usages, prescriptions, act or acts of parlia-
ment, or any other thing contrary notwithstanding.
82 JENSEN, supra note 77, at 2.
83 JENSEN, supra note 77, at 3.
84 WILLARD HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 12
(1941).
85 Id.
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framers of the Constitution for the federal government agreed that
there was both room and need for pardoning power in a democracy.
Alexander Hamilton said that such a power is required "by
considerations of justice, of humanity and of public policy."86 The
constitution of the colonies included the pardoning power.8 7
However, the authority to grant clemency was not necessarily the
exclusive right of a governor.88
In most states today the governor has primary authority to grant
clemency.89 In thirty-five states, the governor may either make
clemency decisions directly or exercise this power in conjunction
with an advisory board.9° Five states have boards that make
clemency decisions, and in sixteen states this power is shared
between the governor and a board. 9' The mayor of the District of
Columbia also has clemency powers. 92
The need for a clemency power is now recognized in interna-
tional law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, ratified in 1992 by President George Bush, contains a
provision that states that anyone sentenced to death shall have the
right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.93
A. Courts and the .Clemency Power
Courts have recognized both the importance and the operation
of the clemency power. Chief Justice John Marshall, in United
86 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
7 JENSEN, supra note 77, at 10-11.
' JENSEN, supra note 77, at 10-11.
89 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR ST. CTS., CLEMENCY LEGAL AUTHORITY,
PROC., AND STRUCTURE 1 (1977) [hereinafter NATIONAL CENTER FOR ST. CTS.];
NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSN. CENTER FOR POL. RES., GUIDE To EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES 15 (1988) [hereinafter NATIONAL
GOVERNORS' ASS'N].
9' NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N, supra note 89, at 54.
9' NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N, supra note 89, at 54.
92 NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASS'N, supra note 89, at 54.
9' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; see also John Quigley, Little Known Treaty May Afford Greater
Rights, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 5, 1993, at 6.
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States v Wilson,94 described the clemency power as "an act of
grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of
the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed
from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.
It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate."
In Biddle v Perovich,95 the Supreme Court further clarified
the law on pardons:
A pardon in our day is not a private act of grace from an
individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the
constitutional scheme. When granted it is the determination
of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be
better served by inflictions less than what the judgment
fixed.96
Disparities in punishment due to the rigidity and flexibility inherent
in a discretionary penal system can be mitigated by clemency. It is
one of the ways of bringing law and justice into harmony.
Judicial review of clemency actions has been limited in scope.
While courts have adjudicated issues including the refusal to accept
pardons, 97 legislative limits on clemency9" and due process
claims,99 courts will not analyze the executive's rationale in
granting a clemency. Using both the separation of powers and the
political question doctrines, courts have considered most challenges
to the executive's use of discretionary power unreviewable.
Granting clemency is a discretionary act.' °° The Supreme Court in
94 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833).
9' 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
96 id.
97 See United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
9' Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
9' Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981) (holding
that there is no liberty interest in pardon).
o The language of the constitution sets the limits and legal standards for the
governor. For example, the Ohio Constitution requires that a person must be
convicted and allows clemency to be granted by a governor for any crime except
treason and cases of impeachment. The standard that is required is "upon such
conditions as he [the governor] may think proper." See supra note 72. A
governor is to use her judgment as to which petitions for relief are valid,
appropriate and in the public interest.
Other jurisdictions have agreed that a governor's use of the clemency power
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in Baker v Carr' articulated its nonjusticiability test:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossi-
bility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolu-
tion without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unques-
tioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one ques-
tion. '02
The broad language authorizing clemency in the U.S.
Constitution and in most state constitutions is "a textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment of [the] issue to a coordinate
political [the executive branch] department." 103
The law on clemency is settled. Regardless of the reasons an
executive may have for granting clemency, the scrutiny of this
discretionary act will be left to the political process rather than to
the courts.' 0
is discretionary. See Eacret v. Holmes, 333 P.2d 741, 744 (Or. 1958); Exparte
Crump, 135 P. 428, 431 (Okla. Crim. App. 1913). However the Oklahoma court
did state that a governor could not legally commute a death sentence because of
his conscientious objection. See Henry v. State, 136 P. 428, 431 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1913). See also discussion infra pp. 33-37; JOEL SAMAHA, SOME
REFLECTIONS ON THE ANGLO-SAXON HERITAGE OF DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND DISCRETIONARY LAW 4 (Lawrence E. Abt & Irving
R. Stuart eds., 1979).
" 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
102 Id. at 217.
103 Id.
"o The Ohio Supreme Court is clear about not violating the separation of
powers doctrine by examining the governor's use of clemency. In Knapp v.
Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 377 (1883), the Ohio Supreme Court said:
[A]ny attempt of the courts to interfere with the Governor in the
exercise of the pardoning power, would be manifest usurpation of
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B. The Need for Clemency
The fallibility and inflexibility of the legal system are justifica-
tions for the clemency power. In the eighteenth century, William
Blackstone commented on the need for clemency to mitigate the
harshness of English law. °5 The founding members of this
republic also recognized how the strict rule of law could sometimes
work a hardship. Alexander Hamilton gave this rationale for the
clemency power, "The criminal law code of every country partakes
so much of necessary severity that without an easy access to
exception in favor of unfortunate guilt justice would mean a
continuance too sanguinary and cruel."'0 6 Chief Justice William
Howard Taft succinctly articulated the necessity of the clemency
power:
Executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue
harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforce-
ment of the criminal law. The administration of justice by
the courts is not necessarily always wise or certainly
authority. The nature of our government forbids it. The long contest as
to the rightful authority of government is in some respects ended. In
our national and state constitutions the powers of the three branches of
government, the legislative, the executive and the judicial, are clearly
defined and limited, and the important truth is at length understood,
that each can best preserve the jurisdiction and power confided to it,
by carefully abstaining from all interference with the rightful authority
of the others. Our government is one whose powers have been
carefully apportioned between three distinct departments, which
emanate alike from the people, have their powers alike limited and
defined by constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their respective
spheres of action equally independent.
Id. at 391-392.
In the recent challenge to commutations of death penalty sentences by former
Governor Celeste, the court for the 10th appellate district of Ohio once again
explained its position on judicial review, stating, "[I]t is not this court's function
to inquire into the wisdom or merit of the former governor's actions." See
Wilkinson v. Maurer, Nos. 92AP-674, 92AP-675, 92AP-677, 92AP-678, 92AP-
680, 92AP-1297, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2045 (Apr. 8, 1993).
105 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 387 (1769).
116 THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 16 (Alexander Hamilton).
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considerate of circumstances which may properly mitigate
guilt. To afford remedy it has always been thought
essential in popular governments ... to vest in some
authority other than the courts power to ameliorate or
avoid particular criminal judgments."7
Chief Justice Taft, who had been president, understood that this
power was to be used as a check on the judicial system.
Mistakes (particularly the conviction of an innocent person), the
rigidity of the law and the unfair application of the law are but
three reasons for a process in which a decision maker can consider
as much information as necessary to modify a prison sentence or
free a person from punishment. Clemency is the fail-safe in our
criminal justice system.
The possibility of mistake is not as infrequent as one would
suppose. Scholars and advocates who specialize in death penalty
litigation routinely make this complaint. Radlet, Bedau and Putnam
have identified 416 such cases of erroneous convictions from the
years 1900-1991.' 0' In the last few years, the media has told
numerous stories about innocent persons wrongly convicted. For
example, the film documentary, The Thin Blue Line by Errol
Morris detailed the Texas death row incarceration of Randall Dale
Adams, who was subsequently set free.1 °9 Adams had been
convicted of killing a Dallas police officer on a Dallas road after
he hitched a ride with sixteen year-old David Ray Harris on a
Thanksgiving weekend in 1976. Adams spent 12/2 years in prison.
The Thin Blue Line is credited with Adams' release. A state court
overturned the conviction in 1989. Three prosecutors connected
with the trial were either dismissed or left the Dallas District
Attorney's office. Several witnesses in the original trial admitted
that they had given perjured testimony. 0 In February, 1993
Walter McMillian, who spent six years on death row in Alabama,
was set free by prosecutors. The prosecutors finally admitted that
107 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21 (1925).
"0s MICHAEL L. RADLET et al., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE, Preface (1992).
109 THE THIN BLUE LINE (Miramax Films 1988)
10 See Milestones, TIME, Apr. 17, 1989, at 69; see also Donald P. Myers,
The Next Life of Randall Dale Adams, NEWSDAY, May 8, 1989, at 2-1.
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they had the wrong man."' It took five appeals and a 60 Minutes
investigation to free him."2 McMillian had a one and a half-day
trial. The story of Clarence Chance and Benny Powell of Los
Angeles, California is similar."3 Powell and Chance had been
convicted of killing Los Angeles Deputy Sheriff David Andrews.
Although these men were not facing the death penalty, they both
served seventeen years in a California prison after being wrongly
convicted of murder." 4 This case was overturned because the
police withheld evidence that the jailhouse informant who testified
against the men had also implicated others." 5
While none of these persons was granted clemency, it is clear
that mistakes were made and they were innocent. Being innocent,
however, is not necessarily enough to save a person from the full
penalty of the law, once she is convicted of a capital crime.
According to Herrera v Collins,"6 the Supreme Court refused to
hear a habeas claim based on innocence. However, the Court
recommended that the Texas death row inmate apply for a pardon
or commutation, since clemency is the historical, legal mechanism
for such relief. Despite the fact that pardons or commutations based
on innocence are rare,"' even parole board officials recognize the
need for these procedures."'
"H Christopher Colford, Cruel, But Not Usual Mistakes, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, Mar. 7, 1993, at 3C.
112 Id.
113 See Michael A. Kroll, Facing Death After Tainted Prosecution; Looking
at the Chance-Powell Case, How Often Does Sordid Misconduct Occur?, L.A.
TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1992, at B7.
114 Id.
115 See Sheryl Stolberg, Probe Shows Men Unjustly Convicted: Judge Frees
Pair After 17 Years In Prison, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 26, 1992, at A2. On June
28, 1993, the Washington Post reported that Kirk Bloodsworth, who was twice
convicted of murder and rape of a nine year-old girl would be released because
DNA evidence concluded that Bloodsworth was not the perpetrator. At one time
he had been sentenced to death. See Amy Goldestein, DNA Test May Free Man
Once Sentenced to Death, WASH. POST, June 28, 1993, at D1.
116 113 S. Ct. 2325 (1993).
..7 See Kevin Krajick, The Quality of Mercy, CORREcTIONs MAG., June
1979, at 47, 50.
118 Parole Board officials acknowledge the fact that the criminal justice
system can sometimes be arbitrary and that there is a need for a mechanism to
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Just as convicting an innocent person is not the only example
of the miscarriage of justice, innocence is not the sole justification
for clemency. The reasons for granting clemency include doubt as
to guilt, changes in the political climate and laws that reflect
societal enlightenment concerning the nature of certain
offenses. 119
As discussed in parts IV and V, the rationale for clemency for
battered incarcerated women should fall well within acceptable
societal criteria based on justice, mercy and fairness. However,
governors must first be persuaded that they should use this power.
C. The Role of Governor
A governor is the highest authority in the executive branch of
state government. 120 She serves as administrative head, commander-
in-chief, legislative leader and party chief. She may even enter into
relationships with foreign jurisdictions.
Modern American governors are primarily concerned with three
broad areas of operations: policy formation, public relations and
management. 121 A governor is perceived by citizens as someone
responsible for running government, getting highways built,
supporting education, keeping a state's economy sound and insuring
compensate for that flaw. The chairperson of the Ohio Parole Board called
clemency "a great procedure." Telephone Interview with Margarette Ghee,
Chairperson, Ohio Parole Board, Department of Rehabilitation and Correction,
State of Ohio, in Columbus, Ohio (June 10, 1993).
"9 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR ST. CTS., supra note 89, at xvi. Presidents
Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson pardoned the confederate soldiers after
the civil war in an attempt to heal the nation. See JONATHAN T. DORRIS, PARDON
AND AMNESTY UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON (1953).
120 For example, the Ohio Constitution provides, "[Tihe Supreme executive
power of this state shall be vested in the governor." OHIO CONST. art. III, § 5.
When a governor is one of several directly elected members of the executive
branch, he is part of the plural executive. See JOHN A. STRAAYER ET AL., STATE
& LOCAL POLITICS 125 (1994). Other members of the plural executive could
include the lieutenant governor, secretary of state, attorney general, treasurer, etc.
Id. at 126.
121 COLEMAN B. RANSONE, JR., THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR IN THE UNITED
STATES 115 (1970).
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that there is employment.
The chief executive has both formal and informal powers.
Formal powers consist of messages, vetoes, the formulation and
execution of the budget, control over state agencies, appointments
and the overall administration of state programs. 22 Among the
informal powers are: the skills of bargaining and persuading
prestige of office, popular and political party support and the mass
media. 12
3
While a governor has certain mandated functions based on the
constitution and statutes, she still has considerable discretion in
deciding which of the various functions will receive the most
emphasis. The citizenry expects that a governor will perform those
mandated responsibilities. 24 Citizens also know that she is
expected to use her best judgment in matters that require discretion
because it is neither judicious nor practical to come to the people
on every matter that must be decided. A government run by
referendum is just not efficient.
The policymaking and administrative roles of a governor are
generally accepted as the normal course of business. However, a
governor is also an actor in the criminal justice system. The prisons
are under her control as the chief executive.'25
Additionally, when all other avenues have been exhausted, the
clemency power gives a governor the final word as to whether a
convicted person will remain incarcerated, for how long, or whether
the death sentence will be carried out. In fact, before parole boards
became the administrative bodies to oversee the early release of
prisoners, the only appeal was to a governor.
126
Because state constitutions grant a range of clemency powers
122 ALAN ROSENTHAL, GOVERNORS & LEGISLATURES CONTENDING POWERS
5 (1990); see also STRAAYER, supra note 120, at 135. Straayer refers to a
National Governors' Association Study that evaluates the above mentioned levels
of formal gubernatorial authority. STRAAYER, supra note 120, at 135.
123 STRAAYER, supra note 120, at 135.
124 See STRAAYER, supra note 120, at 124.
125 Prisons are a part of the executive branch of government and are
therefore subject to the control of the chief executive.
126 EDWARD RHINE ET AL., PAROLING AUTHORITIES, RECENT HISTORY AND
CURRENT PRACTICES 9 (1991).
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from plenary to limited, the role of a governor in the process will
vary. A chief executive's exercise of this power will be influenced
by her personal philosophy about crime and punishment and
perhaps, to a greater extent, the political realities of being tarnished
with the label of being "soft on crime." For this reason, during the
1970s the National Governors' Association counseled newly elected
governors to use the clemency power sparingly.
12 7
In recent years, it has been politically risky to show any
consideration for convicted criminals, especially those who have
committed capital offenses. Politicians now feel compelled to pass
the death penalty litmus test when running for office, even though
they do not have to make the ultimate decision as to whether an
inmate should live or die. 128
However, a few modem governors have felt compelled to
exercise their constitutional authority, especially in death penalty
cases, despite the contrary mood of the public. California Governor
Edmund G. (Pat) Brown in his book, Public Justice, Private Mercy,
explains his rationale for granting clemency:
As I understood it, the section of the California
.27 See LEGAL ADVICE FOR THE GOVERNOR, NAT. GOVERNOR's CONF.
CENTER FOR POL. RES. AND ANALYSIS, GOVERNOR's OFFICE SERIES 4 (1976).
The legal advisor offers this caution:
Executive clemency should be extended to inmates serving their
sentences (usually in the form of a commutation) only after a careful
review of all relevant information and only where the sentence is
clearly inappropriate and can be shown to be so to any reasonable
person. The same caution applies to clemency decisions concerning
persons discharged from their sentences and to extradition decisions.
Cautiousness, deliberateness, and restraint are required to overcome
public and local anxiety about the Governor's alleged "interference"
with the judicial system and to allow the Governor to feel confident
about making those clemency and extradition decisions which justice
requires.
Id. (emphases added).
128 See William Schneider, Attack Politics; Running to Win on the Low
Road, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1990, at Ml; see also Kenneth Bresler, Seeking
Justice, Seeking Election, Seeking the Death Penalty: The Ethics of Prosecutorial
Candidate Campaigning on Capital Conviction, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 941
(1994).
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constitution that granted the governor the power of
clemency--defined in my dictionary as "a disposition to be
merciful"--had little to do with guilt or innocence, or even
with the finer points of the law. The first was for a jury
and the original judge to decide; the second was the job of
the appellate courts. What I as governor had to look for
was some extraordinary reason why the defendant should
not be executed.129
Former Governor Michael DiSalle of Ohio, who was also an
opponent of the death penalty for moral reasons, 3 " granted
clemency to twelve persons, including one woman on death row.
DiSalle felt that the fate of those who would be executed was often
decided by "men influenced more by public climate and public
clamor than by abstract justice....3 l
Theoretically, when governors grant clemencies they have made
the decision that the public welfare and justice are better 'served by
either reducing the sentence, delaying an execution or totally
forgiving the convicted person. However, some chief executives'
actions have been attacked for granting clemencies with question-
able motives.132 Some segments of the public do not want mercy
granted to a petitioner, regardless of the merit of the case. Others
may feel that a governor should only grant a pardon when
innocence has been proven. 33 While it might not be a violation
of the law per se to go beyond this criterion, in some minds it is an
abuse of discretion. In recent years, there have been attempts to
modify the clemency power because some lawmakers have
disagreed with the chief executive's clemency decisions.'34 Some
129 EDMUND G. (PAT) BROWN & DICK ADLER, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE
MERCY 10 (1989).
130 MICHAEL D. DISALLE & LAWRENCE G. BLOCHMAN, THE POWER OF
LIFE AND DEATH (1965). DiSalle said, "I believe human life is a divine gift and
deliberately to destroy it is as much a crime for the State as for the individual."
Id. at 6.
'I3 DISALLE & BLOCHMAN, supra note 130, at 4.
132 See discussion infra pp. 48-53.
1. See discussion infra pp. 44-48.
114 When Governor Celeste commuted the death sentences of eight persons
just before leaving office, Ohio State Senator Gary Suhadolnik sponsored a
resolution to amend the Ohio Constitution to prevent an outgoing governor from
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legal scholars have also opined that an executive's power should be
curtailed and political accountability could be insured by establish-
ing clemency boards or employing other mechanisms of con-
trol. 135
D. Executive Discretion
Understanding the relationships of executive power, discretion
and constitutional conventions is important in analyzing how a
governor can use the clemency power. This section examines how
these concepts can impact the decision-making processes of a
governor who contemplates granting a clemency. Most governors
do have full legal authority to pardon or commute sentences;
however, this discretionary act may be restrained by political forces
granting a pardon to a death row convict during the ninety-day period prior to
the end of the governor's term. See S.J. Res. 1, 119th Ohio Gen. Ass. (1991).
State Representative Suzanne Bergansky introduced H.B. 212, Which would
require that the governor give a three-day notice to various interested persons of
his or her intention to grant clemency. Neither of these proposals became law.
Ohio Attorney General Lee Fisher, along with newly elected Governor, George
Voinovich, challenged the commutations on procedural grounds. However the
appellate court has upheld the Celeste clemencies. See supra text accompanying
note 104. These cases are now pending before the Ohio Supreme Court.
135 See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrestling the
Pardon Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569 (1991). Although this is a
recurrent theme in some legal scholarship, the author has grave reservations
about this approach because the author is not convinced that two or more heads
are better than, or less political than, one. However, whether to encumber the use
of the clemency power by governors is not the focus of this Article. The scope
of this Article assumes that if governors have the virtually unfettered discretion-
ary power to grant clemency, how should their actions be judged? Christopher
E. Smith and Scott P. Johnson question whether there are enough checks and
balances on the presidential pardoning power in their article, Presidential
Pardons and Accountability in the Executive Branch, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1113,
1124 (1989). They suggest one mechanism for limiting the president's power
would be requiring that no pardon could be granted until after a criminal trial to
allow for thorough investigations by counsels and publication of the facts. This
aspect of the presidential power is distinguished from the gubernatorial exercise
of clemency in that in most jurisdictions, conviction has to take place before a
clemency can be granted.
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such as public opinion. The public's views on crime and punish-
ment and their expectation of how the executive will exercise her
clemency power form an unwritten code of conduct for governors,
known as constitutional conventions.'36 The discussion that
follows explains how these three factors affect clemency.
Executive power is rarely defined in state constitutions.
However, the power that a chief executive exercises is controlled
in at least four ways. The formal constraints are the constitution,
statutes and, to some extent, the common law. Laws provide
express boundaries of the limits of power. The fourth restraint on
an executive's use of authority is informal. Tradition or conven-
tions are the nonlegal parameters within which the executive will
usually attempt to stay in order to be within the good graces of her
constituency. Public opinion is a check on discretionary power.
There are various definitions of discretion: "the liberty or power
of deciding or acting without other control over one's own
judgment," '37 "the space between legal rules in which legal actors
may exercise choice,"' 38 "an express grant of power conferred on
officials where determination of the standard according to which
power is to be exercised is left largely to them" '39 and an action
"which requires exercise in judgment and choice and involves what
is just and proper under the circumstances." 4 ' Professor Kenneth
C. Davis describes discretion as not being limited to what is autho-
rized or what is legal; it includes all that is within the effective
limits on the officer's power. 41 Davis has argued that while
decision makers need to be able to exercise discretion, there is also
136 See discussion infra pp. 41-44.
'37 WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 522 (2d ed. 1978).
"I See KEITH HAWKINS, THE USE OF LEGAL DISCRETION: PERSPECTIVES
FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE USES OF DISCRETION 12 (1992).
"9 See DENIS JAMES GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS, A LEGAL STUDY
OF OFFICIAL DISCRETION 1 (1986). Galligan theorizes that discretionary power
is important "in any system of authority, that there are good reasons for having
discretion and that discretionary powers are neither necessarily nor typically in
some way arbitrary and beyond the law." Id. at 2.
140 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 467 (6th ed. 1990).
141 KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
4 (1980).
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an equal need to control discretion in an effort to see that it is used
wisely.'42 Keeping equilibrium between law and discretion is not
an easy task. Roscoe Pound wrote that all legal systems have had
to develop principles of the exercise of discretion and that a
balance between rules of law and discretion is perhaps one of the
most difficult problems in the science of law.'43
Abuse of discretion is often difficult to define because its
meaning is contingent upon the facts and the particular circum-
stances. This term has various meanings, including failure to
exercise the granted power conscientiously and advisedly, without
considered judgment, offhandedly, carelessly, hastily, or with bad
motives, 144 effecting an injustice or exceeding the bounds of
reason.44 Abuse of discretion, in conjunction with the executive
branch, is not typically a standard to judge the constitutionally
based execution of power by the chief executive himself. However,
this term generally refers to the characterization of an administra-
tive agency decision that has been found unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, or in error as a matter of law.'46 However, as with
judicial discretion, executive discretion is expected to be guided by
principles, grounded in some combination of ethics, experience and
justice.'47
When a governor uses the power of discretion through
clemency to modify the result of law, as in the cases of battered
incarcerated women, there is always the possibility that some may
feel that the executive has ceased to govern in an appropriate
manner and has betrayed the public trust. This opinion is not totally
without justification because, historically, rule by discretion can be
dictatorial and arbitrary. As a result, society is more comfortable
with the idea that following specific rules will ameliorate the
chance of abuse or an inequitable application of the law."4
142 Id. at 26.
14' Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of
the Special Code, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 927-28 (1960).
144 Id. at 932.
145 1 C.J.S. Abuse (1985).
146 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
'a7 See Pound, supra note 143.
"4' Pound quotes Lord Camden, who reportedly said, "The discretion of a
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Discretionary power is exercised not only by the chief executive
in the civil affairs of state, but she, along with numerous other
actors, are authorized to use discretion in criminal justice matters.
An element of administrative discretion is operative at five
levels of the criminal process. Initially, the policeman must
decide whether or not to arrest the suspect; the common-
wealth's attorney must determine whether to prosecute the
suspect; the trial judge decides whether to modify or to
suspend the jury's determinations of punishment; the
appellate court must decide whether to grant a writ of
error. Finally at the terminal release stage, the parole board
decides whether to parole the prisoner and the governor
decides whether to grant a pardon. 14 9
The fact that the there may be tension between power of
discretion and the rule of law, particularly in the criminal justice
context, is not a modem concept. Joel Samaha's essay on the
Anglo-Saxon heritage of discretionary justice gives examples of
how this conflict dates back at least to 600 A.D. in Anglo-Saxon
criminal law. 0 He explains how the laws of the kings, which
often called for arbitrarily administered judgments, could be
modified and tempered by the administration of church penitentials
and how the Archbishop used his discretion in meting out
sentences."' 1 While the aim of the secular authority was to see
judge is the law of tyrants: It is always unknown; It is different in different men;
It is casual and depends upon constitution, temper and passion. In the best it is
often caprice; in the worst it is every vice, folly and passion to which human
nature is liable." Pound, supra note 143, at 926. Judges are given the discretion
to modify the result of law. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allow a judge to grant relief from judgment of an order under for "any other
reasons justifying relief from the operation ofjudgment." See FED. R. Civ. P. 60.
Jury nullification is an accepted part of the Anglo-American jurisprudence. Jury
nullification occurs when the jury in a criminal case will not find guilt because
they believe that the application of the law would be an injustice. See United
States v. Krzyske, 852 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir. 1988) (discussing history of jury
nullification).
' William F. Stone, Jr., Pardons in Virginia, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 307
(1969).
0 See SAMAHA, supra note 100, at 4.
15' See SAMAHA, supra note 100, at 6.
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that the law's penalty was administered (punishment), the goal of
Canon law was also to save the soul and reconcile the sinner to the
church. 1
52
The priest's exercise of discretion was generally attacked for
three reasons: favoring special interests, promoting the priest's own
personal welfare (i.e., accepting a bribe), or indirectly encouraging
an increase in violations by arbitrary, capricious and corrupt
administration of rules and standards (i.e., the rich receiving a
different standard of justice than the poor).'53
The criticisms of the criminal justice system have not changed
much over time, despite the fact that the rationale for imprisonment
and the severity of punishment has vacillated in each era. Samaha
explains the need for discretion:
The fundamental urge to ensure equality before the
law-that is, to administer justice consistently and objec-
tively-has been tempered with the basic necessity that the
law be sensitive to individual differences that the punish-
ment fit not only the crime but the criminal.
5 4
There will be disagreement from time to time about the
reasonableness of a governor's discretionary action. Our expecta-
tions of how a chief executive should function within the discre-
tionary realm is often dictated by constitutional conventions. These
conventions, as will be explained below, are shaped by public
opinion. Attitudes about women, punishment and the right to
defend oneself from a violent intimate partner directly affect a
governor's use of clemency.
E. The Role of Constitutional Conventions and the Clemency
Power
Constitutional conventions are judicially unenforceable,
unwritten rules that are based on political traditions and public
opinion, which regulate the political behavior and provide for the
152 See SAMAHA, supra note 100, at 7.
'" See SAMAHA, supra note 100, at 11-14.
114 See SAMARA, supra note 100, at 4.
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political accountability of politicians.'
In a recent article concerning political behavior, Professor
James Wilson adopted the concept of constitutional convention
from the British. According to British legal scholars, conventions
are "customs practices, maxims or precepts" that are at the core of
"constitutional or political ethics."'156 In the British system,
conventions are unwritten grants of constitutional power because
"they are neither codified by statute nor part of the English
common law."' 57 These conventions work to "prevent tyranny,
constrain discretion and generate an internal political morality."'
' 58
Wilson points out the distinctions between the American and
British systems by emphasizing that the former is more complex.
The American system is more complex because it has written
constitutions (federal and state) and the English system does
not. 5 9 Therefore, whereas the English Parliament has sovereign
power to make any convention law, American constitutions limit
the Congress (and state legislatures) as to which conventions can
become statutory law.
160
The application of pardoning power in Wilson's inventory of
American textual constitutional conventions helps describe the
presidency.' 6' As previously discussed, the courts have considered
decisions made pursuant to this power nonjusticiable.162 However,
' The use of this term is distinguished from the constitutional conventions
that amend the U.S. Constitution in Article V. See James Wilson, American
Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially Unenforceable Rules that Combine
with Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to Regulate Political Behavior, 40
BUFF. L. REv. 645, 647 (1992). This section of the Article relies heavily on
Professor Wilson's work. Wilson's thesis is that the courts should not hear cases
that involve constitutional conventions, rather it is the body politic that should
resolve the dispute.
56 Id. at 658. Wilson provides a summary of the British characteristics of
constitutional conventions taken from Professor Geoffrey Marshall's work,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE RULES AND FORMS OF POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY 210-11 (1984).
'" See Wilson, supra note 155, at 647.
'5 Wilson, supra note 155, at 651.
"9 Wilson, supra note 155, at 667.
160 Wilson, supra note 155, at 668.
161 Wilson, supra note 155, at 673.
162 See discussion supra pp. 27-29.
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that legal conclusion does not end the constitutional controversy.
The way in which a chief executive uses this discretionary power
can be greatly influenced by public opinion, which may be steeped
in tradition, custom and practices. Violating a convention (i.e.,
acting in a way that is nontraditional or offends basic constitutional
norms) could be considered the functional equivalent of abusing
discretionary power.6 3 The penalty for such an action can be as
extreme as defeat at the ballot box. What constitutes a breach of
the constitutional convention regarding the use of the clemency
power is not necessarily clear or consistent. Our views on crime
and punishment give some indication of our expectations regarding
the disposition of criminals.'64 The discussion which follows
163 See infra pp. 48-51 for examples of clemencies that were criticized.
164 See Richard LaCaup, Lock 'Em up! ... With OutragedAmericans Saying
Crime Is their No. 1 Concern, Politician are again Talking Tough. But Are They
Talking Sense?, TIME, Feb. 7, 1994, at 50. LaCaup points out that while violent
crime was down by 3% in the first six months in 1993, and most crime is
leveling out, the public is preoccupied with crime. Id. According to the F.B.I.
statistics, over the past 10 years incidences of crime have risen by 23%. Id.
President Bill Clinton's "Three Strikes and You're Out" proposal in the Omnibus
Crime Bill, is indicative of the political climate. See Leslie Phillips, Clinton
Pitch: Hardball/'Three Strikes' Plan Targets Repeat Felons, USA TODAY, Jan.
26, 1994, at 49. H.R. 3355 is a compilation of 34 anti-crime bills introduced or
approved by the House of Representatives during the last year. The "three
strikes" provision mandates life in prison for any person who is convicted of a
third violent crime when the last crime was a federal crime. See Holly Idelson,
Highlights of House Crime Bill, CONG. Q., Apr. 23, 1994, at 1004. A special
report by Money magazine provides a reality check on the issue of crime. See
Walter L. Updegrave, As Grim Crime Scenes Fill Our Newscasts And
Nightmares, But the Surprising Truth For Most People Is That ... You're Safer
Than You Think, MONEY, June 1994, at 114. Updegrave makes the following
conclusions:
1) "Violent crime is not at an all-time high," because 90% of Americans are
safer today than in the past two decades. Id. at 115. However, 88% of persons
polled for the article believed just the inverse. Id. at 116.
2 "Violent crime is not a equal-opportunity offender;" the risk of being a
victim is four times higher if you are 16 to 19 years old if you are Black. Id.
3) Eighty-two percent of the poll respondents also said that a woman is
more likely to be victimized by a stranger than a man. Again, the inverse is true.
"A woman victim is twice as likely to be injured 59% vs. 27% if her assailant
is a spouse, ex-spouse or boyfriend rather than a stranger." Id. at 119.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
analyzes these beliefs and how they affect the decision to grant
clemency to battered women and the public's response to such an
action.
IV CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, MERCY OR JUSTICE AND THE
CLEMENCY POWER
Justice (jus Us) -
Mercy (mir ) -
the quality of conforming to principles of
reason, to generally accepted standards of right
and wrong and to the stated terms of laws,
rules, agreements in matters affecting persons
who could be wronged or unduly favored165
A refraining from harming or punishing offend-
ers, enemies, persons in one& power etc.,
kindness in excess of what may be expected or
demanded by fairness, forbearance and com-
passion. 166
Theories of morality, crime and punishment directly impact our
attitudes on how justice and mercy ought to be administered.
Exercising the executive prerogative of clemency requires an
understanding of the competing values of punishing the guilty and
providing relief from the "[u]ndue harshness .. .of the criminal
law."'167 This section focuses on the central tensions between the
principles of justice and mercy and how the rationales for punish-
ment shape our notions of fairness and forgiveness and affects
grants of clemency for battered women. The application of these
theories in individual cases will be further discussed in part V
See also Henry J. Reske, Throwing Away the Key, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1994, at
66. Reske cites three jurisdictions, Washington, New York and California, that
have either instituted some form of a "three strikes" policy or are debating the
issue. Id.
165 RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 727 (Revised ed. 1988).
166 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 987 (6th ed. 1990).
167 Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21 (1925).
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Eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophers, such as
Kant, 6 ' Hegel, 169 Bentham,1 70 Rawls 171 and others have in-
fluenced Western thought on punishment. Their theories, outlined
in Kathleen Moore's Pardons, Justice, Mercy and the Public
Interest,'72 range from retribution-the requital according to
,61 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W. Hastie tr. 1887).
Kant stated that it was the right of the sovereign as the supreme power to inflict
pain upon a criminal. He believed that public justice was a principle of equity
and that retaliation is a just penalty for wrongdoing. Therefore, capital
punishment is the appropriate penalty for a murderer. Unless execution in such
a case is carried out, the people would be regarded as participants in the murder
as a public violation of justice. Kant was generally opposed to pardoning as
being unfair to society because, in his opinion, it allows criminals to enjoy an
advantage unfairly won and undeserved. However, Kant did provide for
exceptions to his prohibition of pardons: Kant would not consider a clemency
unjust if the person who broke the law did not enjoy equal liberty under the law.
See MOORE, supra note 2, at 33.
169 Hegel's theory of punishment was grounded in the concept of treating the
person as a rational human being, who chose to break the law and therefore
chose to be punished. When society decides not to sanction criminals, those
persons are being treated as objects rather than humans. According to Hegel,
lawbreakers have a right to be penalized and clemency denies them that right.
MOORE, supra note 2, at 46-47.
170 See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE UTILITARIANS 162, 166 (Dolphin Books
1961). Utilitarianism suggests the general object of all laws is to augment
community well-being. Punishment is considered evil and should only be
administered to exclude a greater evil. This is the principle of deterrence. Id.; see
also MOORE, supra note 2, at 37. Moore summarizes Bentham's utilitarian
justification for punishment as follows:
1. The state has the duty to achieve a specified object.
2. Laws are the instruments by which the state is to reach its object.
3. Infractions of the law frustrate the achievement of the object.
4. The state has the right to punish infractions of the law so far as this
is necessary to achieve its object and within limits established by the
nature of its object.
Utilitarians rarely make exceptions for the penalty inflicted to account for
individual differences, because the good of the community is the goal of
punishment. Therefore, clemency is not an appropriate action once the sentence
has been determined.
171 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
172 See MOORE, supra note 2.
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merits or deserts especially for evil' 73-to revenge-retaliation
for injuries or wrong, 171 which can be more severe than what
may be actually deserved. Deterrence-the prevention of crime and
rehabilitation-and restoring the person to society via isolation for
moral improvement are also rationales for punishment.
The criminal law institutionalizes specific passions (anger,
resentment, etc.) that are directed at wrongdoers.' 75 The eye for
an eye, just deserts, retributionist principles may sometimes clash
with values that would promote absolution in certain cases. The
debate of whether clemency is an aspect of justice or whether
mercy is truly unmerited and therefore a gift is ageless and
unresolved.'76 Theorists like Moore have determined that retribu-
tion provides a principle for equity in that similar persons ought to
be treated similarly, and that "any difference in the way people are
,177treated ought to be based on significant differences ....
173 RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1128 (Rev. ed. 1988).
174 Id. at 1129.
175 See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS & MERCY 2
(1988). U.S. citizens say that crime is among their top concerns. See Richard L.
Berke, Crime Joins Economic Issues as Leading Worry Poll Says, N.Y. TiMEs,
Jan. 23, 1994, at Al. Berke indicates that this preoccupation with crime will be
a "front-line issue in this election year." Id; see also discussion supra note 164.
176 Justice and mercy are concepts that can be considered mutually exclusive.
For example, Jeffrie Murphy promotes the idea that in the criminal law, there is
little room for mercy, because mercy and justice are irreconcilable. He states:
If we simply use the term "mercy" to refer to certain of the demands
of justice (e.g., the demand for individuation, then mercy ceases to be
an autonomous virtue and instead becomes a part of (is reducible to a
part of) justice. If this becomes obligatory, and all the talk about gifts,
acts of grace, supererogation and compassion becomes quite beside the
point. If on the other hand, mercy is totally different from justice and
actually requires (or permits) that justice sometimes be set aside, it
then counsels injustice. In short, mercy is either a vice (injustice) or
redundant (a part of justice).
MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 175, at 169.
On the other hand, Christian philosophers have taught that mercy is a
separate consideration, which has little to do with fairness or even justice. See
Nehemiah 9:17; Psalm 30:26; Psalm 119:76; Matthew 5:7; Luke 6:35-36.
177 See MOORE, supra note 2, at 93. Moore's work is a philosophical analysis
of the pardoning power of presidents. Using a retributionist framework
(wrongdoers deserve punishment), she finds that even retribution will allow for
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forgiveness to "achieve the highest justice." Moore suggests four criteria for an
adequate theory of pardons. She states that 1) there should be room for criticism
of pardons (i.e., that it is possible to abuse the pardoning power); 2) this theory
should make clear the justification for punishing and the justification for
pardoning; 3) it should be grounded in a general moral and political philosophy
(i.e., what is right for the state to do); and 4) the theory should have a practical
application. MOORE, supra note 2, at 9.
Moore attempts to articulate rules (conventions) that should govern the
clemency power. For example, she postulates that pardons can be justified when:
1. The offender has already suffered enough;
2. The offender stands to suffer too much because of special circum-
stances;
3. Relieving any punishment that is too severe; and
4. Relieving the lingering consequences of criminal conviction.
MOORE, supra note 2, at 168-77.
Moore also lists six general types of pardons that she considers abusive:
1) Pardons to promote the public welfare (i.e., granted to persuade a
person to turn state's evidence);
2) Pardons to promote the private welfare (of the pardoner);
3) Pardons to reward past actions (i.e., stopping a prison riot);
4) Pardons for pity sake (to relieve suffering);
5) Pardons on recommendation of judge, jury or district attorney; and
6) Pardons based on sex or family status.
MOORE, supra note 2, at 209.
In applying Moore's disjunctive test of justified clemency to the circum-
stance of battered incarcerated women who strike back at their abusers, a
reasonable person could conclude that these women (accounting for individual
differences) pass three, if not all four of the criteria. If the facts show that a
woman has been beaten by the abuser and cannot leave the relationship or if she
is in the midst of a confrontation that could cause her great bodily harm or death
and she defends herself, has she not suffered enough? Does she not stand to
suffer too much if the criminal justice system fails to take into account her
special circumstance through the introduction of exculpatory expert evidence or
through an appropriate self-defense instruction? Considering the fact that these
women receive very long sentences even when the cases are disposed of through
plea bargaining, a clemency action could relieve punishment that is too severe
and as a result relieve the lingering consequences (felony status, separation from
children who often end up in the public care) of conviction.
None of Moore's abusive criteria is relevant to legitimate cases of battery.
While some might argue that granting battered women clemency resembles an
act of pity or an action based on sex, neither pity nor the femaleness of the
petitioner is at issue. The clemency is being requested to compensate for or to
mitigate the harshness of the result caused by any number of factors. See Linda
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Moore's analysis makes room for the notion that there is not
only a view of justice that includes deserved punishment, based on
wrongdoing and legal requirements, but that there is also a need to
incorporate other moral factors that may not be a part of the legal
system.'78 However, she prefers to characterize a pardon in such
a circumstance as an act of justice, rather than an act of mercy, in
that pardons should ensure that people suffer only those punish-
ments that they deserve.'79
Whatever the characterization, Moore's philosophy on the
application of the pardon power is echoed by certain segments of
society. The notion is that clemency, or forgiveness must be
deserved by the grantee because of some extraordinary circum-
stance. The moral and political ideology concerning what is right
for a state to do to and for convicted felons is at the core of the
response that will be generated when clemency is granted. These
beliefs form the basis for judging when the constitutional conven-
tion concerning the exercise of clemency power has been violated.
A. Violated Conventions: Contemporary Criticisms of the
Discretionary Grant of Clemency
Criticisms of clemency have often been in connection with
shielding those with privilege and influence from accountability
under the law (i.e., partisan pardons or pardons to promote the
private welfare).' Recently, President George Bush's pardons of
the six Iran Contra figures raised objections from the public, press
and politicos about the propriety of those commutations.''
L. Ammons, Clemency: A Post Conviction Remedy for Women Who Kill Their
Abusers, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DEFENDING BATTERED WOMEN IN
CRIMINAL CASES FI-10 (Linda L. Ammons & Mario Conti eds., 1993) and
discussion infra pp. 74-78. The petition for clemency is not based solely on the
fact that these persons are women, but the plea is based on how unjustly these
women were treated by the system.
178 MOORE, supra note 2, at 196.
179 MOORE, supra note 2, at 11-12, 196.
80 See discussion on pardons infra pp. 48-51.
"' In his proclamation, President Bush said that his reason for pardoning
Caspar Weinberger, Elliott Abrams, Duane Clarridge, Alan Fiers, Clair George
and Robert McFarlane was because the motivation of their actions was patriotism
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Except for President Gerald Ford, President Bush granted fewer
clemencies than any other president in the past twenty-five
years. 2 President Richard Nixon's pardon by President Gerald
and their prosecutions were the criminalization of policy differences. See Bush
Cites Policy Differences in Granting Six Pardons, CONG. Q., Jan. 2, 1993, at 37;
see also David Johnston, The Iran-Contra Report: The Overview; Walsh
Criticizes Reagan and Bush Over Iran-Contra, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1994, at A1.
Johnson quotes Special Prosecutor Walsh, "I think President Bush will always
have to answer for his pardons ... I think that it was the most unjustifiable act.
There was no public purpose served by that." Id.
"82 President Bush granted 62 pardons. See Iran Contra Bush Ethic Probe,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 26, 1992, at Al. Richard Nixon granted 863 pardons
and 63 commutations, including a commutation to labor leader Jimmy Hoffa.
President Carter pardoned G. Gordon Liddy and 533 other persons and
commuted the sentence of heiress Patty Hearst. In 1977, Carter also provided
amnesty for Vietnam-era draft dodgers. See Proclamation Granting Pardon for
Violations of the Selective Service Act August 4, 1964-March 28, 1973, CONG.
ALMANAC, 1977, at 7-E. President Reagan granted 393 pardons, including the
petition of George Steinbrenner. Reagan was also under considerable pressure
from Sen. Orrin Hatch and others to pardon Oliver North. See Owen Ullmann,
Pardon Would Mean Political Knot for Bush, AKRON BEACON J., May 5, 1989,
at A 14. A Newsweek Poll showed that 51% of persons surveyed favored a pardon
for North. See The Verdict on the Verdict: A Newsweek Poll, NEWSWEEK, May
15, 1988, at 37.
On March 23, 1994 President Clinton turned down the clemency request of
convicted spy Jonathan Jay Pollard. Pollard was a former naval intelligence
analyst who had sold over 1,000 classified documents concerning Arab military
information to Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin was among those who
lobbied President Clinton for the release of Pollard. Upon the advice of Attorney
General Janet Reno, President Clinton declined Pollard's request. See Paul
Richter and Ronald J. Ostrow, Clinton Denies Clemency Appeal in Pollard Case,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1994, at Al.
A group of approximately 500 persons marched down Pennsylvania Avenue
on June 27, 1994 calling on President Clinton to free Leonard Peltier, the 49-
year-old Native American who was convicted 18 years ago of killing two F.B.I.
agents during a gun battle on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. After
Peltier's trial, the prosecutors admitted that they could not prove that Peltier fired
the shots that killed the agents. See Debbi Wilgoren, White Horse Echoes To
Drumbeat Of Protest; Clemency Sought For Imprisoned Indian, WASH. POST,
June 27, 1994, at A11. President Clinton recently appealed to the Singapore
government for clemency in the caning case of Dayton, Ohio teenager Michael
Fay. Fay was found guilty of vandalism and was to have received six lashes from
a cane. The president's intervention reduced the strikes to four. See William
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Ford was perhaps the most controversial pardon in recent
times. 113 Ford's stated rationale in granting the Nixon pardon was
to insure that the tranquility of the nation was not sacrificed by
bringing a former president of the United States to trial.'84
There have also been examples at the state level where
governors have been sanctioned or criticized for using the clemency
power in an arbitrary manner or for what some would consider
improper motives. In 1926, the Oklahoma legislature impeached
Governor J.C. Walton for selling pardons to hundreds of per-
sons. 5 When former Governor Ray Blanton of Tennessee
granted fifty-two clemencies during his final week in office,
Branigan, Singapore Reduces American's Sentence; Teens Parents Still Angry at
4-Lash Edict, WASH. POST, May 5, 1994, at A33.
President Clinton is also being lobbied by several Congress members to
grant amnesty to 50 African-American seamen who were convicted of mutiny
during World War II for refusing to load munitions at Port Chicago in San
Francisco after a blast from similar munitions killed 320 people, including 200
African-American seamen and injured 390. The explosion was so powerful that
it destroyed two ships, injured sailors in their barracks and broke windows in a
hotel 35 miles away. See Richard C. Paddock, A Question of Honor; Survivors
of a 1944 Naval Tragedy Say They Were Wrong By Court Martials-and Racism
of the Era, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 1994, at B16. As governor, President Clinton
never granted clemency for a death row inmate. See Court Album Not Obscene,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 8, 1992, at 8A.
,83 Not only was there a great outcry on this issue by politicians, see Harold
M. Schmeck, Jr., Reaction to Pardon Nixon Is Divided, But Not Entirely Along
Party Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1974, at 25, but President Ford's press
secretary, J.F. ter Horst, resigned as a matter of conscience in protest. See Clifton
Daniel, A Resignationfor Conscience, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1974, at 25. A White
House deputy press secretary stated that as of September 11, 1974, there had
been 5,700 calls supporting Ford and 3,900 opposing him; 16,000 telegrams had
been received by that date and the opinions were six to one against the pardon.
See David E. Rosenbaum, Plan is Assailed in Both Parties, Rhodes, Albert and
Byrd Lead Attack-Pardon for Nixon Still Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1974, at 1. Then-Sen. Walter Mondale proposed a bill to amend the Constitution
to give Congress the power to disapprove a presidential pardon within 180 days
of its issuance. This bill never made it to the Senate floor. See S.J. Res. 241, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
84 Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601 (1974).
185 See 3 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURV. OF RELEASE
PROC. 150-53 (1939).
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Democratic Senator James Sasser called Blanton's action "the
grossest breach of a chief executive's discretionary power perhaps
in the history of the State of Tennessee."'86 The incoming gover-
nor, Lamar Alexander, went to court to have the clemencies
overturned. However, the courts upheld Blanton's decision." 7 In
1986, New Mexico's outgoing Governor, Tony Anaya, commuted
the sentences of all five death row inmates just before leaving
office. Governor Anaya was harshly criticized, especially by his
successor, Governor Gary Carruthers.' Governor Mario
Cuomo's release of Jean Harris came after years of lobbying by
advocates on her behalf. Cuomo is said to have granted the request
because of her above average behavior in prison. Harris had also
suffered three heart attacks. 189
Most governors are conservative in their use of the discretionary
power of clemency.'9" Whenever an inmate petitions a governor
for a grant of mercy and she has the sole discretion to make that
decision, she must decide whether the case before her warrants
186 See Larry Sabato, Gubernatorial Clemency: A Time of Trial?, 42 STATE
Gov'T 40 (1980).
181 Id. at 41.
188 On a television news program, Governor Anaya said that he was
commuting the sentences because putting the prisoners to death would be
"inhuman, immoral and anti-God." He also based his decision on what he called
the disproportionality of how the death penalty had been applied in that state.
McNeil-Lehrer Newshour (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 27, 1986). While a
Sante Fe newspaper called Anaya's action abusive, a Washington Post editorial
characterizedthe decision as "courageous." See Reprieve on Death Row, WASH.
POST, Dec. 4, 1986, at § 4.
"89 Jean Harris is Freed, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY., Jan. 11-17, 1993, at
27. Harris was convicted of killing Dr. Herman Tarnower, also known as the
Scarsdale Diet Doctor, after a 14-year relationship.
'9' When Governor Richard Celeste was contemplating the decision of
clemency for incarcerated battered women, he said to the author, "I want to treat
them like anything else. I will respect the input from the Parole Board." In a
November 1990, interview with 48 Hours reporter Erin Moriarty, the governor,
responding to a question about a hypothetical case said, "I want to make that
judgment based on a very careful examination of that person's very specific
circumstances." Transcript on file with the author. Finally, in the December 21,
1990 press conference announcing the first set of clemencies, Celeste said, "My
goal has been to be cautious in granting commutation."
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clemency. Among the facts that a governor will weigh are: the facts
about the crime and the petitioner, public opinion and what she
feels about how the criminal justice system should have responded.
Any two governors faced with the same petition can come to
different conclusions as to whether clemency should be exercised.
On the rare occasion where two successive governors are faced
with the same clemency petition, they may agree that the prisoner
should be relieved of the burden of the sentence.' There are also
circumstances where a state's public policy and the law either
contributed to an unfair result for a class of persons in the criminal
justice system or a change in the law comes too late to assist those
who might have benefited from it. When a person affected by such
circumstances says to the governor, the final arbiter in the criminal
justice system, reconsider the circumstances of my case in light of
the changes in the law and public policy and extend your power of
mercy to me on behalf of the state, is it then an abuse of discretion
for a governor to do .so, even if she decides that not only will she
review the one case, but any others that come before her that are
similarly situated?
Posing this question another way-are battered women who
commit a homicide, while arguably defending themselves, the types
of persons who should be considered for clemency in light of
changing societal and scientific attitudes about the effects of
battering and the corresponding changes in the law? If these
women's punishments are undeserved or too extreme, why are
governors hesitant to review these cases? Fear of being accused of
violating a constitutional convention regarding clemency, which can
provoke adverse public reaction, may certainly be a deterrent.
Whether public opinion, will be a factor or the factor is a critical
element in most gubernatorial decisions. After all, positive public
opinion propels a candidate into office, and keeps him or her in
' A pardon granted by former Governor Celeste to Freddie Moore and the
commutation of sentences of Saram Bellinger and John Salem were challenged
by Governor Voinovich soon after he succeeded Governor Celeste. See MOORE,
supra note 2. Voinovich decided to no longer pursue having these clemencies
overturned by the courts and granted the men the same relief. See Mary Beth
Lane, Voinovich Oks Clemency Celeste Gave, CLEV, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 21,
1992, at 1.
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office. Further, a governor has a duty to balance the ability to lead
and represent the constituency. In the clemency process, this
weighing is most deliberate and sometimes calculated to avoid
opposition. The balancing of public opinion will be determined by
the executive's personal sensibilities and his views on leadership,
justice, crime, punishment and reelection.
V CLEMENCY Is APPROPRIATE FOR BATTERED WOMEN WHO
DEFENDED THEMSELVES AGAINST THEIR BATTERERS
A. A Remedy for Undue Harshness or an Abuse of Discretion?
Clemency for Ohio Battered Women
Criticism of executive action is to be expected. Dissent is
central to the American political system. However, not all criticism
is constructive, objective, nonpartisan, or valid. Therefore, the
appropriate analysis regarding criticism is to ask whether the
objections that have been raised are justified, not whether an action
is improper because objections are expressed.
When the initial twenty-five women were granted clemency in
Ohio, prosecutors were among those who expressed the loudest
disapproval. In a New York limes article, subsequent articles and
media statements, representatives from that group complained that
the clemencies were improperly granted." 2 Prosecutors also said
that they had not been consulted about the propriety of granting the
clemencies.' 3 While other states may have different procedures,
in Ohio, at the parole or clemency hearing stage before the Ohio
Parole Board, input from the prosecutors is sought through a
systematic process, 94 and in all the cases that came before
192 See Wilkerson, supra note 5. However, for a different point of view see
also Lawrence Grey, Celeste's Grants of Clemency Brought Law, Justice Into
Accord, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 30, 1990, at 3D. Judge Grey serves on the
4th District Court of Appeals of Ohio.
193 Grey, supra note 192, at 3D.
194 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.12(A) (Baldwin 1992); see also OHIO
ADMIN. CODE § 5120:1-1-15(C) (1993). Ohio prosecutors are not alone in
objecting to the use of clemency or battered women. See, e.g., Tim Novak, When
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Governor Celeste, this procedure had been followed.
In addition to the prosecutor's statements, the trial judge's
opinion and community sentiments were taken into consideration.
Rarely before had prosecutors as a group decided to challenge the
propriety of an Ohio governor's decision to exercise his discretion-
ary authority in commuting the sentences of inmates.'95 Compar-
ing Celeste's record with that of his predecessor, Governor James
Rhodes, it is clear that Celeste was conservative in his use of the
clemency power.196 Celeste had not acted ultra vires, according to
the law, so why did the prosecutors act so vituperatively?
Among the arguments prosecutors made were the following: the
Ohio Supreme Court did not make the Koss ruling retroactive; that
the inmates' claims of abuse are no guarantee that they would have
been acquitted of the charges had such evidence been permitted at
Criminals Beg His Pardon, Edgar Takes It Case By Case, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, May 19, 1994, at IA. Novak quotes Ray Nash, Chief of the Criminal
Division of the Will County, Illinois State's Attorney, "If we went through the
expense, the trouble and the toil to put someone in prison, that's where we think
they belong! I haven't seen a clemency petition that I've liked yet. That's the
opinion of most prosecutors." Id; see also Gina Boubion, Women Who Killed
Their Mates Seeking Clemency In California, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 8, 1992, at
A4. Boubion states that the strongest opposition to the clemency proposals in
California came from prosecutors. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), stated that prosecutors have an obligation to
"govern impartially" and "[w]hose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it should win a case, but that justice be done." See also Bresler, supra
note 128, at 943.
195 Former Ohio Governor Mike DiSalle was criticized by the state house
press corps for granting clemency to six death row inmates. He was told that he
sacrificed his chance of a second term. The comments by the press included: "So
you saved the lives of six nonentities . . . ," and "[W]ho cares? If you'd kept
your mouth shut, the world would be no poorer, and you'd be around for another
four years to fight for the underdog." DISALLE & BLOCHMAN, supra note 130,
at 204.
196 From January 1, 1983 to January 10, 1991, Governor Celeste granted 115
clemencies. In this time period, the governor received 2,300 petitions from
inmates and the parole board. From January 10, 1983 through October 15, 1990,
Governor Celeste granted 65 clemencies out of 2,249 requests, or 2.8%. Former
Governor James A. Rhodes granted 145 clemencies out of 660 requests in his
final four-year term, or 21.9%. See Governor Announces Clemency Decisions,
Office of Governor's Press Secretary, Dec. 21, 1990 (on file with author).
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trial; that there is the concern that there will be many women in the
future claiming to be battered; and some of the women were
making up these claims.'97 These types of charges are not exclu-
sive to Ohio prosecutors. These accusations are what governors
potentially face when considering battered women's clemency
petitions.
While prosecutors, however partisan they may be, have the
right to express their opinion about an issue like clemency, the
above arguments have no basis in law, and little or no merit as it
relates to the discretionary exercise of a governor's power of
clemency. The analysis below addresses each of the prosecutors'
arguments.
1. The Ohio Supreme Court did not make the Koss ruling
retroactive. 198
There is, by implication, the opinion either that the governor
cannot grant clemency to persons who may have been similarly
situated as a defendant who is granted relief by a court or that
unless a court makes a ruling retroactive, a governor is without
authority in acting on her own to grant relief to a petitioner. As
previously discussed, a governor's power to commute sentences is
plenary and is not contingent upon other factors.' 99
2. There is no guarantee that they would have been acquitted of
the charges had such evidence been admitted at trial.200
While this statement is true on its face, it is a fallacious
argument for several reasons. First, comparing the act of clemency
to acquittal is not legitimate. Clemency in Ohio cannot be granted
until after a person has been convicted. 20 ' Guilt has already been
established. The question is whether this person will be granted
total forgiveness or a qualified mercy by reducing the sentence. Of
197 Wilkerson, supra note 5.
'g Wilkerson, supra note 5.
'99 See clemency discussion in part III, supra pp. 23-44.
200 Wilkerson, supra note 5.
201 See OHIO CONST., art III, § 11.
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the twenty-eight women granted clemency, only one received a
pardon, and she had already been released on parole. All of the
women had to serve at least two years in prison and all were
subjected to conditions upon their release. Being acquitted means
that the indicted person did not commit a crime. A grant of
commutation is not a declaration that no crime took place, but only
that the sentence will be reduced and, in the case of a pardon, the
results of conviction will no longer be in effect.
Second, there is never any guarantee that a defendant will be
acquitted. However, our system of justice purports to insure that
defendants receive a fair trial. A fair trial includes presenting
evidence that would exculpate or mitigate the charges against the
defendant. Until recently, because of the way rules of evidence
have been construed by judges, vital evidence has been excluded in
battered women cases.2"2 Additionally, the bias against women in
the self-defense rule has contributed to an inequity at trial.20 3
Without the evidence of battering and a modification of the
traditional self-defense jury instruction, the guarantee has been that
battered women would most likely be convicted. Likelihood of
acquittal is, thus, not necessarily a reflection of the fairness of the
trial.
Third, and more importantly, a guarantee of acquittal is not a
prerequisite for granting clemency. While other states may vary, the
only prerequisites for an Ohio governor exercising this power are
outlined in the Ohio Constitution.2 4
The first two reasons given by the prosecutors for opposing
clemency for battered women who are convicted of a felony are
based on incorrect understandings of the governor's clemency
powers. The remaining two arguments are so unsubstantiated that
they appear to be grounded in ignorance of the facts, mythology,
or at worst, misogyny.
202 See GILLESPIE, supra note 32, at 170-71.
203 See GILLESPIE, supra note 32, at 4-5, 182-83.
204 See OHIO CONST., art III, § 11.
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3. There is the concern that there will be a lot of women in the
future, claiming to be battered In our view, it is not a proper
defense to murder. 5
There are many women being battered in the United States.20 6
Not all or even many of these women are forced to defend
themselves by killing the batterer. However, the law does provide
for self-defense. Surely, prosecutors are not suggesting that in the
case of a woman who kills an abuser to defend herself, there is
strict liability. In. addition to this "not a proper defense" argument,
the closely connected and often cited "license to kill" myth2 .7
promotes the "burning bed" ' 8 stereotype of the battered woman
who kills while her husband is asleep. In the years since the courts
first started to admit evidence of battering to prove self-defense,
there has been no wholesale killing of husbands or lovers. Many of
these types of killings occur in the heat of a confrontation.0 9
With the increased awareness of the plight of battered women and
the increase in shelters and other programs, the percentage of
women killing their partners has decreased."0
4. Some of these women are making this up.
This claim that women have lied about the type of abuse that
they have suffered when the facts overwhelmingly demonstrate that
abuse, like rape, is consistently underreported, makes this argument
205 Wilkerson, supra note 5.
206 See discussion supra pp. 5-9.
207 See Andy Rooney, Celeste Declares Open Season On Ohio Men,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 28, 1990, at lIa.
208 See Maguigan, supra note 40, at 396-97.
209 Maguigan found that out of 223 incidents analyzed, 75% were confronta-
tional. This data is consistent with the statistics generated in the review of the
Ohio cases. Ninety-two of the files reviewed indicated that the homicide occurred
while the batterer was awake, alert and beating the woman. Maguigan, supra
note 40, at 396-97.
20 See Council Reports, supra note 14, at 3186.
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incredible."' This type of reasoning further underscores the
ignorance, hostility and resistance that women face when having to
deal with some prosecutors. It is possible in battering cases, just as
in every other criminal case, that the accused may lie or exaggerate
her position. Thus, prosecutors need not fear this possibility any
more than they do in other cases. The adversarial process will
allow the court and the jury to find the truth.
None of the above arguments are valid legal or nonlegal
criticisms of granting clemency to battered women forced to defend
against their abusers. Rarely will a prosecutor support a clemency
petition. 2 ' Some prosecutors may take the position that they have
no legitimate role in the clemency process and make no recommen-
dation.213
Prosecutors know and understand discretionary power. They are
among the law enforcement officials who repeatedly and systemati-
cally exercise discretion. For example, in the areas of charging,
plea bargains and retrials, prosecutors have broad discretion in
handling cases.21 4 The district attorney determines what charge he
will pursue against the defendant, how that case will be presented
before the grand jury for the bill of indictment and in the case of
a homicide, if a capital specification will be added. The prosecutor
can decide if a case should go to trial or if she is willing to accept
a plea bargain. Finally, if a case can be retried, the prosecutor uses
his discretion in determining whether or not he should pursue that
course.
Prosecutors have often been singled out for not being aggressive
2' See MAJORITY STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY 103D
CONGRESS, The Response to Rape: Detours on the Road to Equal Justice (1993),
at 11; see also Senate Report, supra note 17.
"2' Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 75, at 156.
213 Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 75.
214 More than one-third to one-half of all felony cases are dismissed by the
prosecution prior to a determination of guilt or innocence. See Cassia Spohn et
al., The Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the Decision to
Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 CRIM. 175, 177 (1987) (citing Barbara
Bland, The Prosecution of Felony Arrests, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (1983));
Kathleen B. Brosi, A Cross-City Comparison of Felony Case Processing,
INSTITUTE FOR LAW & SOCIAL RES. (1979).
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in prosecuting the claims of battered victims.215 Advocates have
blamed prosecutors for being as much at fault as police in being
barriers to abused women getting relief in the courts. However, like
the clemency power, the enforcement power is also deemed to be
discretionary and courts are reluctant to interfere with the exercise
of that authority. In United States v Cox, 21 6 the court stated that
the discretion to charge or not is unfettered.
2 17
211 See Margaret Gates, Victims Rape and Wife Abuse, in WOMEN IN THE
COURTS 195 (Winifred Hepperle & Laura Crites eds., 1978); see also Elizabeth
Anne Stanko, Would You Believe This Woman? Prosecutorial Screening for
Credible Witnesses and a Problem of Justice, in JUDGE, LAWYER, VICTIM, THIEF
63 (Nicole Hahn Rafter et al. eds., 1982); Jane W. Ellis, Prosecutorial Discretion
to Charge in Cases of Spousal Assault: A Dialogue, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 56
(1984). In recent years, some prosecutors and city attorneys have established
policies on domestic violence prosecutions. For example, the Los Angeles City
Attorney considers domestic violence cases a top priority. See OFFICE OF THE
CITY ATTORNEY, Los ANGELES COUNTY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DOMESTIC
PROSECUTION UNIT, MISDEMEANOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS (6th
ed. 1993). The San Diego City Attorney's Domestic Violence Unit considers
itself the largest specialized prosecution unit in America. San Diego investigates
approximately 500 cases a month and has thirty full time and volunteer staff
members. See Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role
of the Police Officer and the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REv. 297 (1993). The
San Diego office became more aggressive after failing to get a conviction in the
Judge Joseph Davis domestic violence case. Judge Davis was tried for allegedly
beating his pregnant girlfriend. The girlfriend recanted her story and disappeared
shortly before trial. The city attorney decided to pursue the case, but at trial,
Judge Davis would not admit the 911 call, evidence of the girlfriend's pregnancy,
or the existence of a domestic violence restraining order.
216 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); see also
Powell v. Katezbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906
(1966).
217 Cox, 342 F.2d at 171. However, courts will question a prosecutor's
discretion if justice and constitutional or federal rights are being denied. See
NAACP v. Levi, 418 F. Supp. 1109 (D. D.C. 1976). Professor Davis points out
the potential for abuse in an unchecked prosecutorial power of discretion:
All along the line an enormous discretionary power is the power to do
nothing for instance, the power not to prosecute may be of greater
magnitude than the power to prosecute and it certainly is much more
abused because it is so little checked. The power to do nothing or
almost nothing or something less than might be done seems to be the
omnipresent power ....
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It is inconsistent for prosecutors to challenge the use of the
unfettered, constitutionally granted, discretionary power of
clemency exercised by a governor, when they have the similar
authority in the enforcement area. A prosecutor grants mercy each
time she uses her discretion to reduce or drop a charge when she
feels the accused should not be prosecuted to the fullest extent of
the law. Prosecutors know, perhaps better than anyone, how the
system can be manipulated for wins and losses as opposed to
insuring that the whole truth is revealed. How does one explain the
vehemence expressed by those who oppose clemency for battered
incarcerated women? Perhaps, it is the honest articulation of moral
indignation at taking a life, and the disapproval of letting
"murderers" go free. Or perhaps by releasing these women, the
professional pride of some of those who had a vested political
interest in "putting people in prison" has been bruised because the
validity of the original prosecutions are called into question. If the
motivations were that simplistic, why do these parties not rally
whenever a commutation is granted? It seems to be true that death
penalty commutations raise the ire of some in law enforcement.
However, only one of these women was on death row. Addition-
ally, most of the commutations granted to non-death row inmates
have been to men.
This leads the author to believe that the cause for this kind of
adverse reaction by some prosecutors is more deep-seated and
complex than what appears on the surface. An alternative
See DAVIS, supra note 141, at 39. Outside forces have challenged the discretion
and bias of a local prosecutor, resulting in the selection of a special prosecutor.
The Howard Beach case illustrates the political power a community has in
getting prosecutions. Because of the lack of confidence in Queens District
Attorney John J. Santucci, a group of African-Americans called for a special
prosecutor to investigate the racial assault of young black men who were attacked
by young white men in the Howard Beach Community. One of the victims,
Cedric Sandiford refused to testify unless a special prosecutor was named.
Governor Cuomo appointed now-Brooklyn District Attorney Charles J. Hynes to
the case. See Michael Oreskes, Why Howard Beach? Notoriety of Queens Attack
Builds on Anger Left from Earlier Assaults, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1987, at B4;
Ronald Smothers, Black Officials Praise Governor on Hynes Post, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 1987, at B4.
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explanation which examines this issue from the perspective of how
male supremacy, female domination and battering are interrelated
may provide insight.
B. Principled, Reasoned Decision Making: Justifications for
Using the Clemency Power to Assist Battered Incarcerated
Women
A Spaniel, a woman and a hickory tree; the more you beat
them, the better they be.21 s
A wife isn't a jug-she won't crack if you hit her a few
times.21 9
The inhumanity of domestic violence is an idea whose time has
come. At the June, 1993 U.N. World Council of Human Rights in
Vienna, petitions signed by 500,000 women in 124 countries
demanded that violence against women be considered a violation
of human rights. This declaration, which includes nine paragraphs
on women's rights, was adopted by 171 United Nations mem-
bers.220
218 Old English Rhyme.
2'9 Russian Proverb; see SHEILA ROWBOTHAM, WOMEN, RESISTANCE AND
REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF WOMEN AND REVOLUTION IN THE MODERN
WORLD 138 (1974).
220 See Anne Reifenberg, UN Adopts Wide-Ranging Human Rights
Declaration, DALLAS MORNING NEwS, June 26, 1993, at la; see also 14 HUM.
RTs. L.J. 301, 359 (1993). Sections 38 and 39 of the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action call for the elimination of violence against women in
public and private life, and the eradication of all forms of discrimination against
women, both hidden and overt. International law scholars proffer that the
definition of refugee should be expanded to include persons with a well-founded
fear of persecution because of their gender. See Linda Cipriani, Gender and
Persecution: Protecting Women Under International Refugee Law, 7 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 511 (1993). Canada is now considering violence against women a
factor in application for refugee status. See also Rebecca J. Cook, State
Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human Rights, 7 HARv. HUM. RTS. J.
125 (1994); Katie Sherrod, Hate Crime: Treaty Should Protect Women, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 12, 1993, at 6J.
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In part I, this Article cited the statistics on domestic violence in
United States, as well as the development of the law as it related
to admitting evidence of battering at trial. Further, this Article has
already explained that until recently in Ohio the common law
prohibited expert testimony on battering at trial. 2 '
Today, there is little debate about whether domestic violence
occurs. However, the law, courts and certain segments of society
have been slow to recognize and admit that relief for battered
women is inadequate, and therefore some battered women are
forced to kill or be killed. In order to analyze the law's response to
these women, it is necessary to understand the historical, legal and
cultural positions on violence to women in the home.
Discussions of race and sex discrimination have primarily
focused on the concept of equal opportunity. Justice issues are
broader than questions of economic distribution. Sex discrimination
must be understood as a form of oppression. While violence is
typically an individual act, it has also a systemic character and
exists as a social practice.
Historically, women have lacked economic, legal and physical
autonomy. Despite our pronouncements about equality, liberty and
2231aebjustice for all, women have been marginalized and dominated
221 State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990)
222 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 62 (1990).
Violence against women is a universal phenomena. A U.N. expert group defines
violence as "[a]ny act, commission, controlling behavior or threat in any sphere,
which results in or is likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological injury
to women." See VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.N. Focus, U.N. DEP'T OF PUB.
INFO., DPI/1174-92071, Jan. 1992, at 1; see also Lori Heise, International
Dimensions of Violence Against Women, 12 RESPONSE 3 (1989). Wife beating
is just one type of brutality that is used to either keep a woman in her place or
to benefit from her exploitation. Other coercive customs include, dowry burnings,
genital surgeries, forced or prohibited abortions and rape. For the first time, the
U.S. State Department is reporting on the treatment of women in its 1994 Human
Rights annual. The document details the abuse of women in 193 countries. See
Steven Greenhouse, State Dept. Finds Widespread Abuse of World's Women,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1994, at Al.
223 Abigail Adams was among the colonial women who tried to convince the
founding fathers to include women's rights in the constitution. She wanted the
new laws to recognize and outlaw the customs that abused women and treated
them "only as vassals of [the male] sex." See Letter from Abigail Adams to John
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by their male counterparts. The Court in Frontiero v Richardson
acknowledged "[o]ur nation's long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination." '224 Female subordination is the objective of male
supremacy.225 Domination seeks to accomplish that goal. The
systemic dominance and acceptance of male supremacy, a tradition
or convention, has been reflected in society's public policies,
private practices and in the law. A U.N. report characterized
violence against women in their homes as "a reflection of the broad
structure of sexual and economic inequality in society." '226 Vio-
lence against women is a form of sex discrimination, a symptom of
social injustice.227
Terrorism in the home has been considered a private affair
Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), reprinted in 1 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 370,
382 (L. Butterfield, ed., 1963).
224 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). Equal protection
analysis based on gender was not adopted by the Court until the 1970s. The
Brennan decision stated that sex, like race was an immutable characteristic. Id.
at 686. The majority of the Court seemed inclined to use a higher standard of
scrutiny (e.g., compelling state interest test), than the test that would be applied
in subsequent cases that challenged gender discrimination. In Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976), the Court articulated the intermediate standard of review for
gender cases. The Court said that classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives. Id. at 197. It is interesting to note that Craig concerned a
gender-based state classification that was challenged because of its harm to men.
The early landmark sex discrimination cases were dominated by male plaintiffs.
See David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's Rights in a
Man's World, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. 33, 34 n.4 (1984).
225 See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 40 (1987)
MacKinnon's approach to analyzing the relationship between inequality and
gender is to examine the question of the distribution of power. One of the
criticisms of the traditional theories of violence against women is that the role
of misogyny has been missing. See Campbell, supra note 16, at 68.
226 Violence Against Women in the Family, U.N. DEPT. OF PUB. INFO.,
DPl/1174-92071, Jan. 1992, at 25.
227 See YOUNG, supra note 222. Young states:
What makes violence . . . oppression is less the particularized acts
themselves, than the social context around them.., which makes them
possible and even acceptable.
YOUNG, supra note 222, at 61.
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because traditionally, "a man's home is his castle."22 Through
the doctrine of coverture, upon marriage, two persons became one,
the one being represented by the husband. 229 A woman belonged
to the man and her legal status was nonexistent during the course
of the marriage. She became his property. Slave women, married
or not, were dejure chattel of their masters.3 0 Wife beating was
considered a right of a husband. Women, like children needed to
be chastised in order not to bring shame upon the household.231
Blackstone commented on the need for such discipline:
For as he is to answer for her misbehavior, the law thought
it reasonable to intrust him with this power of restraining
her, by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that
a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or children; for
whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to
answer. But this power of correction was confined within
reasonable bounds ....232
The "rule of thumb" expression is believed to refer to the right of
228 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
OLD ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE
CROWN AND CRIMINAL CASES 161 (1817)
229 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442-43 (1769). Advocates of
the First Woman's Movement of the mid-1840s were able to persuade various
state legislatures to pass Married Women's Property Acts to allow women to own
property and enter into contracts. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE
LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK
42-69 (1982).
230 A young African-American slave, Celia was executed for killing her
master, Robert Newsom. One night when Celia refused to be further sexually
exploited (she had been raped by Newsom since the age of 14 and already had
two children by him) a fight between Celia and Newsom resulted in his death.
Celia disposed of his body in the fireplace. Celia's defense was based on the
legal principle that a slave in extreme circumstance could use deadly force to
protect her life. See MELTON A. MCLAUIN, CELIA, A SLAVE 86 (1991). A jury
instruction on self-defense would have "interfered to some degree with what
owners saw as a property right." Id. at 100.
231 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 445.
232 Id.; see also MAEVE E. DOGGETr, MARRIAGE, WIFE-BEATING AND THE
LAW IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND (1993).
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a husband to beat his wife with a stick no thicker than his
thumb.2 3
3
The common law in the United States recognized the right of
husbands to beat their spouses. In 1824, in Bradley v State, the
Mississippi court said that a husband had this right of chastisement
"without subjecting himself to vexatious prosecution for assault and
battery .... "2 A North Carolina court held that the standard for
determining if a man could be convicted of assault against his wife
was the effect produced, meaning the seriousness of the injury.235
The court also said, "We will not inflict upon society the greater
evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy to punish the
lesser evil of trifling violence., 236 In State v Oliver, the North
Carolina court had this to say about intervening in cases of wife
abuse: "It is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze and
leave the parties to forget and forgive. 237
The privacy doctrine and distinctions between private and
public spheres were used as an excuse for the legal and cultural
subordination of women.238 The preservation and inviolability of
233 WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 136 (4th ed.
1971).
234 2 Miss. (Walker) 156, 158 (1824). This principle was later repudiated in
Harris v. State, 71 Miss. 462, 464 (1894).
235 State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 349, 353 (1868).
236 id.
237 State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 62 (1874). Interspousal tort immunities
prevented civil suits between husbands and wives. Conjugal disputes, such as
domestic violence claims, were not to be litigated because courts did not want
to interfere with marital harmony by hearing these cases.
238 The private-public distinctions divide reality into two separate spheres.
The private being identified with seclusion, the nuclear family, non-interference
by government entities and a right to be left alone. See Samuel Warren & Louis
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The public sphere
is that reality which is secular, civic and inhabited by men. These distinctions are
not exclusive to American jurisprudential thought. In Western philosophy, the
idea of separation of private and public, can be traced to Aristotle and Plato.
Contemporary philosophers and jurists have developed a concept of privacy that
is rooted in the liberal political tradition of autonomy or individualism. The
nineteenth century industrial revolution created greater separations between the
worlds of men and women. Men's work took them away from home and the
home was seen as the proper place for women. See Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M.
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Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 117 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990). Denying
women the right to vote until the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment was an
obvious example of making sure that women had no voice in public affairs.
When a woman challenged a state's authority to deny her franchise under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court said that the privileges and
immunities clause would not be extended to the question of who could vote. The
court held that while women were persons and therefore citizens, citizenship and
suffrage could be mutually exclusive. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162 (1875).
In an earlier case denying a woman the right to practice law, Justice Bradley
explained the proper place and role of a woman:
The Constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood ... [t]he paramount destiny and mission of
women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.
This is the law of the creator.
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872).
There is no specific textual grant of a right to privacy in the U.S.
Constitution. However, in a contraception case, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court held that a right of privacy does exist based
on a penumbra of constitutional amendments. The right of privacy, although
fundamental, is not absolute. If the state has a compelling interest in regulating
the most private of acts, the courts can uphold that interference. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (determining that after viability, state has
compelling interest in the fetus); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(refuting a claim that consensual, adult, homosexual sodomy is a fundamental
right); see also Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421
(1980). The Constitution is silent concerning private action and the inequity of
women in the home. One scholar suggests that a traditional construction of the
liberty interest provides no constitutional protection for battered women, and
therefore liberty needs to be redefined. See Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty,
59 TENN. L. REV. 441 (1992).
The lines of demarcation between the private and public have not been
clear. Feminists have challenged those distinctions, as being a form of
oppression. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF
THE STATE 191 (1989); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE
FAMILY 110-133 (1989). Okin and others do not deny that there should be
"reasonable" distinctions between the public and the domestic, however, they do
point out how what is considered personal is actually political when analyzed.
Okin talks about the dynamics of power in the family and, historically legally
sanctioned violence. The state's regulation of family life regarding marriage,,
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the family unit were to be maintained, even if the woman's safety
was jeopardized. Therefore, if a woman experienced abuse in her
home, the criminal justice system and other agencies of government
either denied that the abuse took place or told her that it was a
personal problem and she needed to find her own solution.
Criminal assault statutes were not aggressively used to protect
women from the assailants with whom they lived. In some cases,
women were made to feel responsible for their beatings because of
their alleged shortcomings. 2 39
Women began to lobby their legislatures in the 1970s to pass
domestic violence statutes.240 However, laws do little to protect
child custody and divorce illustrates how conceptually private behavior is
controlled by public law. In Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45
STAN. L. REv. 1 (1992), Ruth Gavison states that the real issue is not that line
drawing occurs, but how the distinctions harm women:
In private, women may be vulnerable in ways that are beyond the
scrutiny and censure of the public. Does it follow, then, that women
have no interest in the values of privacy and intimacy, or that there are
no contexts in which women would want to keep the state out of their
lives? We must differentiate between good arguments, derived from the
values associated with privacy, and bad arguments, in which reference
to the same values is used to mask exploitation and abuse. This
distinction is not a matter of language, but a matter of the features of
the specific situations involved.
Id. at 36-37.
239 A questionnaire sent to 216 members of the general public in a 1987
study documented the belief that battered women are to blame for their
predicament. See Charles Patrick Ewing & Moss Aubrey, Battered Women and
Public Opinion: Some Realities about the Myths, 2. J. FAM. VIOLENCE 257
(1987). Ewing and Aubrey state, "More than one-third of those surveyed seem
to believe that a battered woman is at least partially responsible for the battering
she suffers and if she remains in a battering relationship, she is at least somewhat
masochistic and probably emotionally disturbed." Id. at 263.
240 See Linda B. Lengyer, Survey of State Domestic Violence Legislation 10
LEGAL REF. SERV. Q. 59 (1990). As of 1991, 17 states (Alabama, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New
Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming) collecteddomestic crime information. These states account
for 43% of the population of the United States. See MAJORITY STAFF OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG. 2D SESS., VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA 53 (1992). This Senate Report was
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citizens from the unlawful unless they are enforced. Even after laws
were passed, the law enforcement response to complaints was
abysmal. Numerous studies and official government reports show
how police departments have been either negligent or hostile to
pleas for help from women who wanted their battering spouse to
be taken away from the premises.24 If a woman convinced the
a survey from a cross section of America for one week in September, 1992. The
200 incidents of violence against women were said to represent less than 1/100
of the violent attacks against women reported to the police each week. Id. at 4
241 See Kathleen J. Ferraro, The Legal Response to Woman Battering in the
United States, in WOMEN, POLICING AND MALE VIOLENCE INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 155 (Jana Hanmer et al. eds., 1989); see also MARTIN, supra note
27, at 92. Martin cites various examples from police department training manuals
and guidelines of nonintervention policies for domestic violence calls. The U.S.
Civil Rights Commission made the following findings in a 1982 report on
domestic violence:
Finding 3.1 Police decisions, including departmental policies and the
practices of individual officers, affect the justice systems
ability to protect the legal rights and physical safety of
battered women.
Finding 3.2 Police traditionally have viewed most incidents of spouse
abuse as private matters that are best resolved by the parties
themselves without resort to the legal process ....
Finding 3.6 Instead of taking appropriate police action, officers
frequently recommend that domestic assault victims seek
civil legal remedies or file private criminal complaints.
See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Under the Ruling of Thumb: Battered
Women and the Administration of Justice, Jan. 1982 at 21 [hereinafter Civil
Rights]. A recent government survey of over 400,000 women indicated that the
police were more likely to respond within five minutes if the offender was a
stranger than if offender was known to the female victim. See JUSTICE
STATISTICS VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 8; see also Joan Zorza, Must We Stop
Arresting Batterers? Analysis and Policy Implications of New Police Domestic
Violence Studies, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 929 (1994). Zorza reviews arrest data
in Omaha, Milwaukee, Colorado Springs, Metro Dade County and Charlotte.
Zorza concludes that arrests deter battering.
A Chicago study indicated that 40% of the 132 women incarcerated were
serving time for killing an abusive mate. All of these women had called for help
from police at least five times during prior confrontations. See Angela Browne
& Kirk R. Williams, Exploring The Effect of Resource Availability and the
Likelihood of Female-Perpetrated Homicides, 23 L. & SOC'Y REV. 75, 78
(1989).
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justice system that her abuser should be brought to trial and he was
convicted, the courts failed to punish appropriately.2 42
Not only are some police officers reluctant to enforce the law in domestic
violence situations, but sexist attitudes toward women both on the force and in
the field are prevalent. Transcripts of radio transmissions of the Los Angeles
Police Department illustrate such sexism:
"U [sic] won't believe this ... that female call again said susp [sic]
returned... I'll check it out then I'm going to stick my baton in her."
"[N]o but I left a 14 year-old girl that I yesterday handcuffed naked on
my chin up bar wearing nothing but a blind-fold and salad oil ... I'd
like to check on her."
"415 [sic] female huh ... well just slap that silly broad senseless."
See REP. OF THE INDEPENDENT COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEPT., July,
1991, at 87-89.
242 The Civil Rights Commission has also made a finding that judges seldom
impose sanctions commensurate with the seriousness of the offense or compara-
ble with sanctions for similar violence against strangers. See Civil Rights, supra
note 241, at 59. As of 1991, 36 state supreme courts and bar associations have
established gender bias in the courts commissions. Many of these committees
have cited the deficiencies of the courts in dealing with domestic violence. For
example, a report from the Florida task force said: "In too many instances,
judges minimize or do not recognize victims' rights. This problem is
compounded by a lack of training-and a reluctance to appreciate the significant
impact that these attitudes have on the outcome of many domestic violence
cases." See REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY
COMMISSION, 42 FLA. L. REV. 870 (1990); see also VERMONT SUPREME COURT
AND THE VERMONT BAR ASS'N: GENDER AND JUSTICE, REPORT OF VERMONT
TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 1 (1991). A 1985
Hamilton County, Ohio court study showed that a year after a new domestic
violence law was in effect 64% of the convicted batterers did not spend one day
in jail, and less than 10% were sentenced to alternative programs. See Daisy
Quarm & Martin D. Schwartz, Domestic Violence in Criminal Court: An
Examination of New Legislation in Ohio, in 4 WOMEN & POL. 29 (1984).
Los Angeles Municipal Court Judge Ronald Schoenberg has been criticized
in the media for the sentence that he gave O.J. Simpson after Simpson pleaded
no contest to the 1989 misdemeanor charge of spousal battery. Simpson served
no time in jail. See Rimer, supra note 20. The prosecutor said that he had
requested jail time. The judge also allowed Simpson to be treated by a
psychiatrist of his choice over the telephone. See Tamar Lewin, The Simpson
Case: The Syndrome; Case Might Fit Pattern ofAbuse, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 194, at 21. Judge Schoenberg has told reporters that he imposed a
sentence agreed upon by the prosecutors. A release of partial transcripts seem to
support the judge's position that the prosecutor did not request jail time.
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When all else failed and a battered woman finally had the
courage to leave, unless she were self-sufficient or had contacts that
could first secure her safety and then support her and perhaps her
children for a period of time, 43 she would run the risk of experi-
encing greater harm by the batterer, if he pursued her.2"
Women established shelters to assist homeless battered women
in the mid- 1 970s. According to former Surgeon General C. Everett
Koop, it took 100 years to create the first shelter, after Congress
passed a law to prevent cruelty to animals. 45 Even today, with
However, prosecutors have rebutted the judge's statement. The District Attorney
said that in open court proceedings, not reflected in the transcripts, he argued that
Simpson should be jailed. See Sheryl Stolberg & Josh Meyer, Judge Defends
Simpson's '89 Sentence, RECORD, June 23, 1994, at A16.
Judge Cindy Lederman of the Dade County Circuit Court presides over a
domestic violence court. The issuance of protective orders have increased from
4,000 to 9,000 a year under Judge Lederman's administration. Convicted
batterers must attend a six-month counseling program and make court
appearances every two-months for a year. The family of the abusers also receive
services. See Gross, supra note 20.
243 A study on treatment for batterers cautions courts to be careful of
counseling to minimize the fact that a crime has been committed. See Adele
Harrell, Evaluation of Court-Ordered Treatmentfor Domestic Violence Offenders,
STATE JUSTICE INST. 99 (1991). A 1986 New Jersey poll on domestic violence
revealed that the respondents agreed that the "[s]ingle most important reason why
battered women do not leave is that they have no alternative." Forty-five percent
of those questioned said that not having a place to go was the most important
reason for staying with a batterer. See Cheryl Edwards, Public Opinion on
Domestic Violence, A Review of the New Jersey Survey, 10 RESPONSE 6 (1987);
see also Dowd, supra note 30, at 28-31 for examples of the fiscal practical
problems of leaving.
244 Browne & Williams, supra note 241, at 79.
245 Koop, supra note 16, at 97. The first known battered woman's shelter
was established in England in 1971. See ERIN PIZZEY, SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE
NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR (1977). The haven, known as Chiswick, is scheduled to
close in September, 1994 if operators cannot find 50,000f to keep it open. The
refuge can house up to 45 women and 120 children at a time and counselors
receive around 10,000 calls a year.
In 1984, Congress passed the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act,
which authorized monies for shelters. In 1992, President George Bush signed the
Child Abuse, Domestic Violence and Family Services Act of 1992. This law
provides funding to states for domestic violence projects, including shelters. See
42 U.S.C. § 10401 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The need for safe havens is further
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approximately 1,200 shelters nationwide, the demand far exceeds
the need for safe havens for women and children. The public policy
priority of providing assistance is dramatized by the following
comparison. There are 2,600 animal shelters nationally as compared
with the 1,200 battered women shelters.246
In short, domination of women by men, even with the use of
force, until recently had been sanctioned, first explicitly then
implicitly by most, if not all, of our major social and legal
institutions.247
dramatized by the following illustration: From 1991-1993 in Minnesota, more
than 13,000 women and children required housing in battered women's shelters.
Three times that number sought shelter. Daniel Anderson, To Understand and
Stop Men's Violence Means a Hard Look at Home, STAR TRIB., Jan. 5, 1993, at
3E.
246 S. REP. No. 102, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 133, 137. In 1992, the National Domestic Violence hotline, which
received up to 10,000 calls a month, was disconnected because funding was
inadequate. Joan Ryan, Super Sunday Has Dark Side, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Jan. 31,
1993, at 1.
247 Religious institutions have been very slow to become involved in this
issue. The U.S. Catholic Church made its first official statement on battered
women in 1992. Women Need Not Submit To Abuse, Bishop's Declare: Priests
Are Told To Be Ready With A 'Safe Place'for Battered Wives Needing Help,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1992, at B4. This statement to Catholic believers is most
important, considering the church's views on the family and divorce. A women
who was granted clemency in Ohio told this author that one of the reasons why
she did not leave her husband was that she was "a good Catholic girl and the
church frowned on divorce." Other women have felt compelled to remain with
abusive husbands for similar religious reasons.
The memoirs of Abigail Abbott Bailey tell of how an 18th century New
England Congregationalist woman suffered violence at the hands of her husband,
Asa Bailey. Abigail stated that less than a month after her wedding day in 1767,
her mate became very violent. She would be repeatedly abused by Asa, until she
secured divorce from him in 1793 because of his incestuous relationship with
their daughter. Abigail stayed with her husband because of her belief that God
was testing her. See RELIGION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN EARLY NEW
ENGLAND (Ann Taves ed., 1989). Protestant denominations who use the writings
of St. Paul concerning marriage and the submission of women to justify wife
abuse, are being criticized for suspect interpretations and unjustified reliance and
application of Biblical texts to the marriage relationship. See JAMES ALSDURF &
PHYLLIS ALSDURF, BATTERED INTO SUBMISSION, THE TRAGEDY OF WIFE
ABUSE IN THE CHRISTIAN HOME (1989); see also JOHN TEMPLE BRISTOW,
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Second, the credibility of women has always been at issue.
Whether it is an accusation of sexual harassment as in the Anita
Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings, a rape trial, or getting the police
and the courts to believe that a partner is violent, women do not
have the same credibility as their male counterparts.24 The
history of this inequality and second-class status can be traced to
ancient civilizations. 49 Studies have shown that jurors often just
do not believe that a battered woman felt she could not leave her
volatile home or that the abused victim feared death by the abuser
before killing him.2
Society considers killing, in certain contexts, a heinous crime.
We are morally outraged when a person of value is killed for no
apparent good reason. The death penalty in this nation is indicative
of our belief that retribution should be carried out for the deliberate
WHAT PAUL REALLY SAID ABOUT WOMEN (1988).
One woman, responding to a national survey on battering, told researchers
that her doctor used his religious beliefs to try to persuade her to return to an
abusive marriage. Her letter to surveyors stated:
After we separated I told him if we were to get back together he had
to get counseling. He went three times to our family doctor (who is
Baptist) who told him to read the Bible and pray to God and I would
come back to him. Our doctor told me I should have stayed in the
marriage and I was rebelling at God by leaving the marriage.
See Bowker & Maurer, supra note 16, at 41-42.
248 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender and Sexual Harassment, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1467 (1992); Adrienne D. Davis & Stephanie M. Wildman, The
Legacy of Doubt: Treatment of Sex and Race in the Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 1367 (1992).
249 Aristotle believed that both men and women had "excellence character,
but that the courage and justice of the sexes were different." He said that "[t]he
courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying." See 2 THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1999 (Jonathan Bames ed., rev. Oxford ed.
1984). In Politics, Aristotle explained that because women are the weaker sex,
the man's role is to acquire possessions outside the home and the woman would
preserve those possessions as well as provide the offspring. Id. at 2131.
250 See Mary Dodge & Edith Green, Juror and Expert Conceptions of
Battered Women, 6 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 271 (1991); Regina A. Schuller, The
Impact of Battered Women Syndrome Evidence on Jury Decision Processes, 16
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 597 (1992). For an analysis on how society has responded
to wife abuse, see REBECCA EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES (1979).
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taking of a valued life."' Further, neither the reasonable man
standard nor the law of self-defense was designed to excuse or
justify the female killer of the crime of homicide when protecting
herself from an aggressor,25 2 especially when the assailant is an
intimate partner.
These three elements: the historical sanctioning of wife abuse,
the lack of credibility of the female witness and gender bias in the
law of self-defense, while not exclusive in explaining the plight of
battered women, illustrate the social and legal obstacles that she
would face when trying to prove that the killing of her mate was
251 Justice Blackmun has added his voice to the opposition of the death
penalty because of the way it is applied. Generally, a White life taken is
considered more serious and therefore a greater loss and can result in the death
penalty, particularly if the perpetrator is Black. See Callins v. Collins 114 S. Ct.
1127 (1994) Blackmun cites the Baldus study used in McCleskeyv. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987), which showed that blacks who kill whites are sentenced to
death at 22 times the rate of blacks who kill blacks and more than 7 times the
rate of whites who kill blacks. Id. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Whiteness is highly valued. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1758-61 (1993); see also ANDREW HACKER, Two
NATIONS, BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992). Hacker
relays a parable to his students in which they lose their whiteness. The students
respond that they do not think it out of place to be compensated $50 million for
becoming black or $1 million dollars per year for each year that they remain
black. Id. at 32. Maleness is also a valued commodity. See Streib, supra note 49.
The power of a distinctively male body part can mesmerize a nation for weeks.
The sensational trials of Lorena and John Wayne Bobbitt illustrate the point.
Had Lorena cut off John's arm, leg, fingers, etc., this story would probably
never have been heard beyond the Virginian community. Millions of American
women are beaten, tortured, mutilated and killed each year and yet the media and
public interest in these stories are not sustained very long and these crimes rarely
get national and international publicity. One reporter has suggested that because
of Lorena's act and the use of battered woman's syndrome testimony, prosecutors
concerned about vigilante justice could seek to limit such evidence. See Jan
Crawford, Jury Still Out on Strategy in Bobbitt Case, CHI. TRIB., Jan 22, 1994,
at A-1. The comparison of one detached penis with the millions of brutalized
female bodies is a startling juxtaposition.
252 See State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977); Crocker, supra note
32; GILLESPIE, supra note 32, at 93-122; see also Deborah Ann Klis, Note,
Reforms to Criminal Defense Instructions: New Pattern Jury Instructions Which
Account for the Experience of the Battered Woman Who Kills Her Battering
Mate, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 131 (1994).
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either justified or excusable by custom and tradition.
The law and society have been gender-biased when dealing with
battered women who kill their abusers. Thus, a governor should
consider the impact of custom and tradition when reviewing a
petition for clemency and decide whether these and other additional
factors merit her active participation in the criminal justice system
to compensate for a harsh result of the law. Granting this type of
relief is a reasonable, compassionate and justified use of the
clemency power! While a woman's crime may not have been
specifically contemplated by the framers, the language of the grant
of power is usually broad enough to cover a multitude of situations,
including killing an abuser in self-defense.
C. Criteria for Commutations
[T]he law is not merely logic, it's a reflection of societal
values. Those values don't always lend themselves to what
we used to say 50-30 years ago .... The law is life and
life ain't precise.253
Governors should first educate themselves and their staffs
responsible for criminal justice, public health and human services
policy on this issue. The mythology and biases concerning battered
women are so pervasive that, unless there is a proper orientation,
personal perceptions could distort the reality of these situations and
blind decision makers to appropriate action. Then the chief
executive should decide to what extent granting clemency is a
matter of justice, mercy, or both. Being clear on this issue will
facilitate explaining her actions to various constituencies. A
governor's definition of justice can be broader than just what the
law requires and under such circumstance she could use her power
of clemency to reflect a justice as fairness stance.2 4 However, if
253 Statementby SenatorJoseph Biden, Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing
for Judge Stephen G. Breyer Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 104th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), reprinted in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, July 13, 1994, at
39.
254 History is replete with examples of unjust, unfair laws. The laws that
sanctioned slavery and Jim Crow segregation statutes are two examples of legal
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a governor's position is that clemency is a merciful act, and mercy
is separate and distinct from justice, granting clemency to women,
who often have survived inexplicable brutality and a system of
justice that has ignored them, is warranted. Even if a governor's
traditional view has been not to grant clemency at all, these types
of cases are so compelling, that she could justify a departure from
that position. While a governor may have an overall philosophy
regarding clemency, the rationales of why a specific individual is
granted relief can be dictated by the facts.255
Because battered women cases are highly profiled and engender
questions concerning the propriety of setting a "killer" free,
governors will need to explain to the media and their constituents
how they came to their conclusions. One of the advantages of
reviewing a number of battered women's cases at the same time is
that the reviewer can often see recurrent themes, (e.g., isolation,
sexual abuse, etc.) and the systemic neglect of these women by the
governmental agencies whose purpose is to serve and protect the
public. Engaging in a review of several of these types of cases may
appear to be a "class action," but ultimately the chief executive
must decide whether the actions of the individual before him were
justifiable, or should this person be simply forgiven. This type of
analysis is not just specific to battered incarcerated women who
seek clemency but can be applied to a variety of applications for
clemency.
A governor needs to decide the relevant criteria for granting
clemency. The inability to introduce evidence of battering at trial
may in itself be sufficient. However, there are additional reasons
injustice. Courts and legislatures have had to respond to pressure to change these
laws. Although a governor cannot unilaterally change a law, the state's
constitution does give him power to modify the result of the application of the
law in specific cases.
255 For example, a governor might decide that a woman was properly
convicted but that based on the facts of the case, her sentence was too harsh. Her
grant of clemency to reduce the sentence could be construed as an act of mercy.
On the other hand, a woman who did not receive a fair trial or clearly acted to
defend herself or another could be given clemency under the theory that her
conviction was unjust, and therefore justice is the basis for the clemency. These
two illustrations should not be taken as the only approaches to the justice or
mercy, justice and mercy analysis.
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why governors would use this power. For example, the fact that a
plea bargain was arranged is significant in that facts and issues that
may have been raised at trial were not heard. The following list
should not be considered exhaustive, but are further examples of
lifestyle and systemic factors that could persuade a governor or
others responsible for review to take action: ineffective assistance
of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, prejudicial pretrial publicity,
dissents and inferences of court opinions in the case, physical
illness, prior record of arrests of the batterer in conjunction with
battering, geographic disparity of sentencing, innocence, race,
cultural differences, institutional record, religious affiliations, the
likelihood of rehabilitation and the risk of harm that she poses to
the community." 6 Each case may have some or few of the
elements listed above. Depending upon the details, one of the above
facts may either be enough to grant clemency or a governor could
engage in a cumulative approach by applying a "totality of the
circumstances" test that would take into account any number of
issues.
While courts are limited in considering some types of evidence,
a governor is not bound by these rules. The history of the batterer
can be most illuminating in trying to reconstruct the social context
and the mindset of the woman. Looking for a "classic" battered
woman may not be a thorough inquiry. However, there are factors
that are considered typical abusive physical and psychological
episodes. Isolation from family and friends, humiliation, rape,
bizarre sexual demands, beatings, death threats, miscarriages, or
injuries to the abdomen (particularly during pregnancy) and breasts
are not unusual. Threatening the woman with guns and other
weapons is also common. A study by Anson Shupe and William
Stacey of 542 women in battered women's shelters in the Dallas-
Fort Worth area revealed how creative batterers can be in selecting
their instrument of torture.
There were of course, many women who had been stabbed,
cut, shot and pistol-whipped. But in family violence the
256 See supra note 177 (criteria listed above were among factors considered
in Ohio cases); see also Alison M. Madden, Clemencyfor Battered Women Who
Kill Their Abusers: Finding A Just Forum, 4 HASTINGS WOMEN's L.J. 1 (1993).
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definition of a weapon embraces a virtual inventory of
household objects that otherwise might seem perfectly
harmless. During our research we began keeping an
unofficial tally of the weapons that women reported their
men had used. This list, which obviously does not exhaust
all the possible weapons in a household "arsenal" that
could be used to hurt included pistols, shotguns, knives,
machetes, golf clubs, baseball bats, electric drills, high-
heeled shoes, sticks, frying pans, electric sanders, toasters,
razors, silverware, ashtrays, drinking glasses and beer
mugs, bottles, burning cigarettes, hair brushes, lighter fluid
and matches, candlestick holders, scissors, screwdrivers, ax
handles, sledgehammers, chairs, bed-rails, telephone cords,
ropes, workboots, belts, door knobs, doors, boat oars, cars
and trucks, fish hooks, metal chains, clothing (used to
smother and choke), hot ashes, hot water, hot food, dishes,
acid, bleach, vases, rocks, bricks, pool cues, box fans,
books, and, as one woman described her husband's typical
weapons, "anything handy.",
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A governor can use the resources of state government to collect
data about the abuser or if necessary reinvestigate the case. State
bureaus that maintain files from police departments on felony or
misdemeanor violent acts can be consulted to determine if incidents
of abusive behavior by the batterer had been reported. Other types
of documentary and testimonial evidence that may be helpful
include: hospital and court records, newspaper accounts, statements
from co-workers, clergy and neighbors. This archaeological
approach to uncovering the truth may still prove to be insufficient
in some cases because the very nature of the worst of abusive
relationships is that they are extremely private and women fear
revealing the horrors of their domestic situation could endanger
either their or their children's lives. 8 Consulting with an expert
257 GILLESPIE, supra note 32, at 57-58.
21 The Justice Department has established that nearly two in three female
victims of violence were related to or knew their attacker, and that victim's may
be reluctant to report it because of shame or fear of reprisals. See JUsTICE
STATISTICS VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 1, 6. The battered woman might also
decline to seek health care when injured, either because of a fear that someone
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who understands the battering phenomenon may assist in deciding
the credibility of the difficult cases.
CONCLUSION
Justice is the end of government. It is the end of a civil
society.259
Therefore justice is far from us .... We wait for Justice,
but there is none. . .. Justice is turned back and righteous-
ness stands at a distance for truth stumbles in the public
square.26 °
The clemency power exists because the strict or misapplication
or inadequacy of the law can bring harsh, unfair and unjust results.
Governors take an oath to uphold the law and the constitutions of
their various states, and to promote the general welfare of all of the
citizens of those jurisdictions. While there is no express mandate to
ever grant a clemency, and this power is and should remain
discretionary, it is difficult to understand how the public interest
can be served by not, at the very least, reviewing those cases where
women claim that they responded to annihilation in the most
fundamental, basic, human and instinctive way. They fought for
their lives.
What to do about incarcerated battered women who strike back
at their abusers in self-defense points to more than just a question
of why she did not leave, or the proportionality of her response.
might discover the abusive relationship, or because such services might not be
available where she lives. See also Lynne A. Foster et al., Factors Present when
Battered Women Kill, 10 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 273 (1989);
Bowker & Mauer, supra note 16, at 36. Even when injured battered women have
sought out medical professionals, physician's privacy beliefs have impeded their
response to domestic violence. See Nancy S. Jecker, Privacy Beliefs and the
Violent Family; Extending the EthicalArgument for Physician Intervention, 269
JAMA 776 (1993).
259 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 352 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
260 Isaiah 59:9, 11, 14.
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 79
The larger issue is how is it that half of humanity can be vulnera-
ble to violence because of their sex and a society can continue to
consider itself just? I suppose that it depends upon one's theory of
justice.

